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Abstract 
Marx is dead. But so is Hayek. With neoliberalism crumbling, Europeans are beginning to 
wonder what it is that is really wrong with the current European Union. The paper proposes 
the following answer: To this day, European integration has not been a process of 
emancipation. This shortcoming, however, is not written on the Union’s face. It requires, 
pursuant to best psychological traditions, a careful analysis of symptoms. One indication of 
the absence of emancipation is, indeed, the Union’s rhetorical embrace of empowerment. 
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Europe: From emancipation to empowerment  
 
Business as usual 
Insiders of European Union studies may have already come up with a guess 
about what a contribution bearing this title is going say. Here is what I 
suspect them to suspect:  
The Union is based on the respect for the individual. This is 
reflected, not least, in an outstanding record of individual rights 
protection.  
Throughout the first five decades of European integration the 
protection of rights has been testament to a process of 
emancipation. 
Emancipation means to accord equal status to formerly 
marginalized groups. Their members are enabled to participate 
without stigmatization or discrimination in open processes of 
social co-operation.1  
Above all, the Union has emancipated individuals from the 
confines of nationality. It has created a zone without internal 
frontiers within which all Europeans are able to pursue their 
opportunities without regard to their nationality.  
What is more, as an agent of emancipation the Union has made 
enormous progress in the field of sex equality. It has also 
improved the situation of other disadvantaged groups by 
combating discrimination on the grounds of race, disability or 
sexual orientation.  
Of course, the process of emancipation has not come to an end. 
New challenges arise quickly in a dynamic and ever faster 
changing society. One of the greatest challenges confronting the 
Union today is to develop a satisfactory solution to the problem 
of admitting third country nationals. The Union perceives this 
                                                        
1 It is not at all implausible to arrive at such an understanding of emancipation on the basis of the 
existing historical record. Emancipation does not have to stem from one’s own effort at 
liberation. It can be granted from above. Its focus often rests on attaining equality of status or 
equal rights. It does not have to concern humanity at large. It may concern particular groups of 
society that have suffered from oppression. See Karl Martin Grass & Reinhart Koselleck, 
‘Emanzipation’ In O. Brunner & W. Conze & R. Koselleck (eds,) Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 2 
(Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1975) 153-197 at 169.  
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challenge as an opportunity to develop innovative solutions on 
the basis of innovative strategies of policy definition, such as 
the Open Method of Co-ordination. 
Nonetheless, the Union has already ventured beyond the 
traditional quest for emancipation. It has expressed ever more 
radically its commitment to the individual. Human well being 
and flourishing are no longer seen as dependent only on the 
emancipation of groups. The focus now comes to rest on 
empowerment. For example, a recent Commission Staff 
Working Paper explains that “the 2007-2013 EU Consumer 
Strategy set the aim of empowering EU consumers to help them 
maximize their welfare, as well as to drive competition and 
innovation”.2 Empowerment pushes the advancement of 
freedom beyond the creation and effective protection of equal 
rights. It aims at enhancing, in this case, the consumers’ “skills, 
knowledge and assertiveness”. Empowerment denotes self-
reliance, for example, the ability to assert one’s interest vis-à-
vis businesses that seek to reap an unfair advantage of existing 
complexity and ignorance.   
Empowerment also means to get European citizens involved in 
creating the social world that they are going to inhabit in the 
future. The revised approach to renewing the European social 
market economy3 is determined to mobilize the people’s 
creativity and to have them involved in processes and projects 
of social innovation.4 In this context, empowerment means, 
first, to address, vigorously and in the spirit of solidarity,5 social 
risks with stakeholders—and not merely for them—with the 
aim, second, to put citizens in a position in which they can avail 
of the human and social capital necessary to lead successful 
lives in a competitive world that confronts them with 
increasing demands concerning flexibility.6 If coupled with the 
right strategies for social innovation, (e.g., social enterprises), 
social empowerment will turn out to be “one of the main 
drivers of economic growth”7.  
Much has been accomplished during the last decades. The age 
of emancipation is not over. At the same time, in the face of the 
most serious economic crisis since the great depression, equal 
                                                        
2 European Commission, ‘Consumer Empowerment in the EU’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_empowerment/docs/swd_consumer_empowerment_eu_e
n.pdf at 1. 
3 See Renewed Social Agenda, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=547.  
4 See the study prepared by the Bureau of European Policy Advisers, which is part of the 
Commission bureaucracy, entitled Empowering people, driving change: Social innovation in the 
European Union, http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/publications_pdf/social_innovation.pdf at 57. 
5 See ibid. at 31. 
6 See ibid. at 15, 27. 
7 Ibid. at 19. 
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rights are not enough. The Union needs to advance towards the 
social empowerment of the individual.  
The following contribution abstains from elaborating further what I have just 
sketched. Rather, it will try to explain why a story of this type would be 
remarkably hollow—even though, as the cited study suggests, it cannot be 
ruled out that some version of it has been already told by some pundit 
catering to the Union’s insatiable appetite for self-aggrandizement.  
 
Why hollow? 
The explanation for why such a story would be hollow is, in part, quite 
straightforward.  
First, affording special protection from discrimination is not an act of 
emancipation. It is not tantamount to releasing someone from a status of legal 
subordination. Rather, it helps to sustain equality of status by raising the 
standard of scrutiny and mitigating the effects of inequality of condition or 
widespread prejudice. Homosexuals are neither disenfranchised nor the 
servants of some master.8 They are equal citizens. Nevertheless, they have to 
enjoy protection from discrimination in order to be able to assert their equal 
status in various social settings. Likewise, being a foreigner does not imply 
second-class status with regard to civil rights. It merely means that in a 
narrow set of circumstances the fact that one is not a citizen may justify 
unequal treatment. Again, introducing protection against discrimination 
helps to make sure that cases of unequal treatment will be rare because of the 
scrutiny applied to the reasons claimed in its defense.  
                                                        
8 In a legal context, in particular, “emancipation” signifies the release from servitude, tutelage or 
bondage. See Grass & Koselleck, note 1 at 161. 
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Second, it would be a stretch to claim that the major beneficiaries of the 
European Union belong to a class to which one would refer as “the excluded” 
or “underdogs”.9 The Union is tailored to the interests of well-educated and 
mobile people. Their vitality has accelerated the pace of the economy and 
therefore by no means mitigated the hardship of those who live more rooted 
lives and belong to the less ambitious part of the work force. It cannot be said, 
at any rate, that this latter group of Europeans has in any meaningful sense of 
the term experienced European integration as a process of “emancipation”.  
Third, even though there is often widespread enthusiasm about accession to 
the Union among the people of accession candidate countries, it would be 
rather bold to say that this affirmative attitude is an outgrowth of a desire for 
emancipation. The reasons for accession are more mundane and, I surmise, 
sometimes even curious. Accession can be quite plausibly seen as a route to 
greater welfare, which is, nonetheless, also paved with more arduous 
business conditions. Accession is also an important token for being 
recognized as a European society in good standing. Paradoxically, being part 
of the Union engages national pride. This points to another reason that very 
plausibly underpins a pro-attitude toward the European Union. Membership 
pays what can be called an “imperial dividend”. If one is part of the European 
Union one is part of something that matters on a global scale. No matter what 
may happen to one in life, one is still part of something that is surrounded by 
an elusive ring of grandeur.  
Not all of these reasons may be indeed “good” reasons for joining the Union. 
It may also, in special instances, be the case that accession is seen as a means 
to escape from the trappings of one’s national culture. Nevertheless, it would 
strike me as rather odd if people, unless they are entrepreneurs, claimed that 
                                                        
9 See Giandomenico Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power: The EU at Fifty (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 147-148. 
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their country’s accession to the Union would mark a major step of 
emancipation.10  
It may be objected that the Union has indeed improved the situation of 
citizens since it has some powers to protect them against the follies of their 
own governments. The Stability and Growth Pact seeks to make sure that 
governments behave fiscally responsibly. The serious concern that the 
Commission has repeatedly expressed over the Orban and Ponta 
governments underscores the Union’s vigilance with regard to human rights 
and the rule of law. But what the Union system does here is to add another 
layer of protection on top of the national system of separation of powers. It 
extends checks and balances to the transnational sphere. In no manner does 
this go beyond the constitutional ideas governing the national level.  
In what follows, I would like to explain that the Union’s embrace of 
empowerment is indeed a symptom of the absence of emancipation; or, more 
precisely, of its subordination to the imperatives of economic performance. 
The Union does not emancipate for the simple reason that it has always been 
organized as a market economy. This is my thesis. Admittedly, the argument 
made to support it will reflect a certain, albeit uncertain, Marxist sensibility.  
More precisely, reading the embrace of empowerment as signifying a dearth 
of freedom is the short story. It is enveloped in a longer story, which concerns 
the problem of liberalism. This problem is nothing short of “the” problem that 
liberalism has with itself. It is manifest in the disturbing fact that it is difficult 
to be free in a liberal society. The veritable perplexity arises from a persistent 
mismatch between “modern” and “ancient” liberty.11 Modern liberty is 
freedom enjoyed in relative independence from others. It is essentially 
                                                        
10 Only for the entrepreneurial class is liberalization also liberation. Perhaps it would even be 
more accurate in their case to speak of empowerment. I shall return to this point below. 
11 I am obviously borrowing the terms from Benjamin Constant. See his Political Writings (trans. 
Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988) at 310-311. 
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private. It is prone, however, to lead to the subtle authoritarianism that comes 
in the twin forms of market pressures and expedient administrative 
intervention.12 The chains of mutual interdependence and benevolent control 
could only be broken if modern liberty were to transcend itself into its ancient 
counterpart, which is ethically far more demanding—and decidedly less 
“nice”13—than its modern political equivalent.14 Ancient liberty means 
subjection to the common will in whose formation one actively participates.15 
It is essentially public.  
The link between emancipation and common control has been insinuated by 
Marx’s vision of “human emancipation”. Alas, it is not easily available to us 
moderns16 who are, as Constant correctly observed, “far more attached than 
the ancients to our individual independence”.17 Since we are, therefore, more 
likely to sacrifice public to private liberty for the simple reason that we 
believe this trade-off to be more beneficial than the reverse, we are also likely 
to remain stuck in a situation where we succumb to control by subtle forces, 
be these markets or the obscure operation of some standard-setting and 
regulating agencies. The dilemma that in its private and its public form 
freedom is potentially self-subversive18 is the upshot of the problem of 
liberalism. Arguably, representative democracy marks the path towards its 
solution.  
                                                        
12 Of the latter threat Benjamin Constant had been acutely aware. See Jeremy Jennings, 
‘Constant’s Idea of Modern Liberty’ In The Cambridge Companion to Constant (ed. H. Rosenblatt, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 69-91 at 73. 
13 See, in particular, on ostracism, Stephen Holmes, ‘The Liberty to Denounce: Ancient and 
Modern’ In Companion, note 12, 47-68 at 60  
14 See Constant, note 11 at 325-327. 
15 See ibid. at 311. 
16 See the perceptive observation by Holmes, note 13 at 51, that “freedom” as envisaged by 
Constant does not include the freedom to choose the type of freedom that one desires.  
17 See ibid. at 317. 
18 The dilemma can also be described as a conflict of the „enabling conditions of self-assertion“. 
Participation in group life is both a condition and a threat to human freedom. See Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger. False Necessity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) at 104-105. 
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It is in this situation that the call for “empowerment” presents itself as if it 
were a compensatory symptom. Hence, in spite of my skepticism concerning 
the story that I suspect insiders to suspect me to have told, I think it is 
possible to see the Union shift from emancipation to empowerment so long as 
this movement is not understood as going beyond one and into the other (in 
the sense of “absorption”), but rather as evidence of how the absence of the 
first gives rise to the second—to the effect that the second becomes a 
symptom of the absence of the first.  
 
Why emancipation? – Historical consciousness 
But why should the question of emancipation be important, let alone be the 
right question to ask? Why would one harbor the respective expectation 
towards the Union? Isn’t it enough that the Union has until recently increased 
the size of the pie? And hasn’t it—remember the truism—been successful at 
securing peace? Why expect something else, something entirely different?  
The Union is an inherently immodest organization. It has successfully taken 
the place of Europe. Throughout its modern history, however, Europe has 
looked at itself from a historical perspective. Regardless of whether one has 
perceived progress or decay, what has mattered was locating the current age 
within a continuum (to which “post-history”, of course, belongs as an 
element). Until to this day, Europe’s premier mode of practical reasoning is 
not analytic moral philosophy, but historical triangulation.19  
                                                        
19 See Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Geschichte als absoluter Begriff: Der Lauf der neueren 
deutschen Philosophie (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, 1991).  
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Over the course of the nineteenth century, emancipation took a prominent 
place when it came to assessing the trajectory of societies.20 It became, 
borrowing Koselleck’s expression, a concept signifying a historical movement 
(geschichtlicher Bewegungsbegriff).21 This concept signifies either the moment of 
liberation or a process of gradual progress. It can be linked either to certain 
groups or to humanity at large. Broadly understood, it is supposed to 
represent something that is already under way. Thus understood, 
emancipation can be halted or inhibited. But it cannot be eliminated. It is the 
force of history itself. 
Arguably, modern liberal democracy is the outgrowth of a movement of 
emancipation. To present itself in this light, at any rate, is part of its legacy. At 
the same time, liberal democracy is the attempt to bring the project of 
emancipation to its legal completion. All are equal. All have rights against 
whoever exercises lawful authority over them.22 Any further step of 
emancipation would have to move beyond eliminating the whim of 
unconstrained power and to wrestle with the mutual dependencies in which 
humans trap themselves because of their mode of co-operation. This, at any 
rate, was the idea at the heart of Marx’s idea of “human emancipation”.  
By taking up the theme of emancipation I do not mean to suggest the survival 
of what has been claimed to be, in the nineteenth century, the driving force of 
history. Nowadays, European humanity appears to be plagued with fatigue 
and disposed to follow its American sibling on the twin path towards 
relentless discipline and perpetual infancy. Nevertheless, the theme of 
emancipation is present in the eschata of human history that the Union has 
embraced after the demise of really existing socialism, namely democracy, 
                                                        
20 See Grass & Koselleck, note 1 at 169, 176. 
21 See Reinhart Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (Frankfurt aM: 
Suhrkamp, 1979) at 341. 
22 The only conceivable further form of emancipation would eliminate the status difference 
between citizens and non-citizens. Whether this would also be desirable is a different matter. 
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human rights and the rule of law. They comprise the core elements of the 
legacy of legal emancipation. What is more, the Union appears to be the 
resolved riddle of human history because these values appear to have been 
proven “right” in the face of the experienced futility of attempts to move 
beyond them. While it may be possible to fancy a more emancipatory 
alternative to liberal democracy it is more than doubtful that attempts at its 
realization would not invariably relapse into some kind of barbarism.  
Nevertheless, any practical belief that is nurtured by the conservative fear of 
more risky alternatives23 must come with a sense of loss. The one author who 
quite perceptively pinpointed this loss right at the moment at which liberal 
democracy appeared to have emerged victorious from “world history” 
realized that what we experienced was not a feast of emancipation but the 
shrinking of human ambition to leading an obedient life of production and 
consumption. The liberal society of the end of history systematically belittles 
humans in that it no longer accords them a role in the making of history. The 
resulting awareness that one is less than one could be induces in some an 
unhappiness with a state in which everyone is supposed to be happy in the 
sense described by British moral philosophers (e.g., experience “pleasure” or 
enjoy the satisfaction of “preferences”). As Fukuyama observes:24  
[T]he dissatisfaction arises precisely where democracy has 
triumphed completely: it is a dissatisfaction with liberty and 
equality. Thus those who remain dissatisfied will always have 
the potential to restart history.  
The post-1989 world of liberal democracy needs to be heeded of its propensity 
to produce a desire in humans to pursue the cause of emancipation beyond its 
limit. This desire, Fukuyama tells us, is dangerous. The boulder of liberal 
freedom would merely have to be rolled up the hill after those who were 
                                                        
23 See Albert Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1991). 
24 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Basic Books, 1992) at 334. 
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annoyed by seeing it sit on the top had pushed it down. At its end, history 
changes its shape from a linear progression to the cyclical recurrence of the 
same. What is more, history morphs from the meaningful realization of an 
ideal into the senseless struggle for and against the same. Against this 
backdrop, the European Union appears cast in the role of Schmitt’s katechon,25 
that is, an empire entrusted with averting apocalypse, in this case, by keeping 
those unruly drives for social emancipation at bay that are prone to lead in 
one way or another to authoritarian disaster.  
 
Why emancipation? – The genus of all deficits 
The role of emancipation as a historically self-adopted European measure of 
history is not the only reason for reintroducing the topic. The other reason 
concerns the variety of deficits that the Union has managed to accumulate. 
The European Union is burdened—albeit not all agree—with a democracy 
deficit, a social deficit and perhaps also with a justice deficit. Once these are 
put into perspective, we may realize that emancipation is the genus of which 
democracy, solidarity and social justice are a species. A disconnect between 
European institutions and the peoples of Europe affects the reality of political 
freedom. European peoples are confronted with serious obstacles when it 
comes to ridding themselves of rules or practices that they dislike. A 
democracy deficit is, thus understood, another name for diminishing 
opportunities to exercise political freedom effectively. If that is the case then 
there is definitely no emancipation. Similarly, when the Union fails to come to 
the rescue of people who are unable to help themselves these people end up 
being locked in their social station. This is not per se indicative of the creation 
                                                        
25 See Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum (trans. G. L. Ulmen, New York: Telos Press, 2006) at 59-60. The task of the Christian 
empire was to restrain the coming of the Antichrist.  
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of greater freedom.26 From such a social perspective, it appears that the core 
reason why the Union is not an agent of emancipation is that it does not 
emancipate humans from the stresses and strains of a highly competitive 
economy.  
But one needs to be circumspect at this point. Since they began slowly to rise 
to the level of the default law of social existence in the eighteenth century, 
competitive markets have been associated with a mode of emancipation from 
markets that is compatible with them. Self-made men like Benjamin Franklin 
first epitomized this mode. His economic success enabled him to extricate 
himself from the unpredictable world of transactions and to lead the 
culturally inherited life of a gentleman.27 Success on markets promised 
decommodification as its reward. However, this was a culturally backwards-
looking manner of conceiving of market-facilitated emancipation. More 
consistent with competitive markets is the vision of market success that is 
immanent and allows one to dominate and to lead certain sectors.28 While this 
entrepreneurial form of emancipation is less complete than freedom that is 
owed to the amassing of wealth it is nonetheless a mode of rising above 
members of the crowd that have to busy themselves with adaptation to 
shifting demand.29 In both the case of the genteel rentier and of the 
entrepreneur markets facilitate the emancipation from markets. They do not, 
that is, presuppose shifting from private to public liberty.  
                                                        
26 If these examples do not sound convincing then consider the sense of alienation that citizens 
feel towards the Union and which has been recognized in various of its official documents. It has 
not disappeared in spite of all efforts at “selling” the Union to its citizens by making it more 
accessible and transparent. 
27 See Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 
1991) at 85. 
28 This form of emancipation is epitomized by Schumpeter’s entrepreneur. See Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (reprint, London: Routledge, 1994) at 132-133. 
29 I once could not help to overhear a conversation between a young entrepreneur in the 
construction business and one of his friends in which the former expressed confidence that he 
would stop working at the age of thiry. I have never found out whether he succeeded at that.  
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The question is whether such a recalcitrant persistence of the private is the 
key to understanding the remarkable career of empowerment. If it were then 
it would not be based on a “political” emancipation, which promises to offer 
reprieve from the bleak realities of economic life through the ennobling 
exercise of active citizenship; however, it would also not be part of “human” 
emancipation, which, according to Marx, establishes common control over 
economic dealings. Rather, empowerment would represent nothing short of 
the economic absorption of the idea of emancipation itself. 
It remains to be seen how such a partial idea of being lucky enough to rise 
above the market can be semantically presented in universal form. The key 
thereto may well be the commitment to put the “individual” at the heart of 
the Union’s concern.  
Below I will briefly sketch Marx’s distinction between mere political and 
human emancipation. The latter is, arguably, Europe’s greatest and also most 
tragic political idea, for it will be forever tarnished with the memories of 
“really existing socialism”. With this sobering experience in mind I go on to 
examine whether market liberalism scores higher on the score of 
emancipation. Arguably, it might do so only if it is “socially embedded” by 
virtue of various strategies of de-commodification. Interestingly, however, the 
Union does not seem to endorse such a view. The Union appears to be 
wedded to the market’s immanent absorption of emancipation in the guise of 
“entrepreneurship” and “empowerment”.  
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Political and human emancipation 
The idea of a “human”, as opposed to a mere “political”, emancipation 
appears in the early works of Karl Marx.30  He introduced this distinction in 
his notorious essay on the Jewish question31 and used it in his polemic against 
the young Hegelians.32  
As a concept, “political” emancipation refers to different, however related, 
phenomena.  
First, the world of the bourgeoisie, in which human beings appear as 
hommes—i.e. by nature as isolated individuals,33—emancipates market 
dealings from the constraints defined by political relationships between and 
among estates, religious communities or guilds.34 Once “emancipated”, the 
economy emerges as governed by principles and regularities of its own. Even 
though of human origin, these are not of human design. For example, that one 
must lower the price of a good in order to sell larger quantities has not been 
laid down as a rule by some regulator. It reflects a regularity that is either of 
an empirical nature or an inference drawn from the premises of rational 
behavior. Even though humans are involved in their making, the principles 
and rules of economics are not an extension of their plans and intentions. 
Hence, they appear to humans as “essentially” different from them. As Marx 
would note in German Ideology and the Grundrisse, the collision among 
                                                        
30 For a valuable introduction, see Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik, ‘Karl Marx als Philosoph der 
menschlichen Emanzipation: Rehabilitation eines verkannten Denkers’ In G. Petrovic & W. 
Schmied-Kowarzik (eds.), Die gegenwärtige Bedeutung des Marxschen Denkens: Marx-Symposium 
1983 in Dubrovnik (Bochum: Bouvier, 1983).  
31 See Karl Marx, ‚Zur Judenfrage‘ In Marx-Engels Studienausgabe, vol. 1 (ed. Iring Fetscher, 
Frankfurt aM: Fischer, 1966) 31-60. On Marx’s embarrassing anti-Semitism and his defence of 
the emancipation of Jews, see Shlomo Avineri, ‘Marx and Jewish Emancipation’ (1964) 25 Journal 
of the History of Ideas 445-450. 
32 See Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Werke, vol 2 (ed. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK 
der SED, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1976) at 117-128. 
33 See Marx, note 31 at 51-52. 
34 See ibid. at 51-52. 
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individuals pursuing their own good in the economic sphere gives rise to an 
“alien social power”. Their relations of interdependence are reflected back to 
them as an “autonomous process and force”. The social relationships among 
individuals thus are imagined to be governed by something that is beyond 
their control.35 In the case of “fetishism”, effects that are caused by human 
relationships are even attributed to things. This matter is manifest in the 
belief, for example, that commodities possess “inherent” value and therefore 
attain value in exchanges.36  
Second, the emancipation of the economy from politics is accompanied by the 
mere political emancipation of human beings from the economy. For example, 
the emancipation from an established religion through the introduction of a 
constitutional principle of neutrality among churches and denominations 
only eliminates religion from the purview of state activity but leaves it in 
place in civil society. Similarly, the elimination of all property qualifications 
for the exercise of the franchise, while neutralizing economic inequality at the 
ballot box, leaves private property in place where it matters the most. Political 
emancipation constitutes a realm that is different from the economy. People 
appear through the formidable ethical lens of citizenship (indeed, they are 
cast in the capacity as a “species-being”). The state, qua embodiment of this 
realm, is elevated above religion and private property. Taking the perspective 
of the state, human beings partake of this emancipation from religion and 
property. Yet, the political form of emancipation from property and religion 
does not extend to the world of ordinary practice in the economy and civil 
society. Political emancipation is human emancipation in imagined form. It 
involves a split into the idealized realm where human beings appear as 
citoyen and the real world of the bourgeoisie where they compete as hommes 
                                                        
35 See Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Werke, note 35, vol. 42 at 127; 
idem & Friedrich Engels, Die Deutsche Ideologie, Werke, note 35, vol. 3 at 34. 
36 See Jon Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) at 
57. 
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for their personal gain. From this follows, that a dominant religion or the 
unequal effects of private property stay in place as long as they are not 
brought about directly by the state. This explains how the two meanings of 
political emancipation hang together. Anything that would be an injustice if 
committed by the state may legitimately be brought about on the basis of 
private dealings taking their course.  While the political sphere is formally 
cleansed of traditional markers of social distinction, the emancipated 
economy is free to reintroduce them through the back door.  
The political system of the bourgeoisie has torn down the walls of status 
inequality.37 It has constituted human beings as individuals who are no longer 
formally distinguished from one another. At the same time, these same 
individuals are pit against one another in competitive races for subsistence 
and profit. The society of the bourgeoisie thereby creates a synthesis of 
political society and slavery. Everyone is included as an equal both into the 
political body and into the uncontainable economic system whose fatal nature 
is particularly sharply revealed in times of trade or fiscal crisis. Subordination 
to economic pressures predominates this “synthesis” since the modern 
economy is governed by laws and regularities whose force politics is de facto 
not free to ignore.38 Indeed, so long as the fundamental rights of the 
bourgeoisie are protected by political society, there is no hope that humans 
could ever emancipate themselves from self-created necessities. In the words 
of Wood:39 
What is alienating is […] that under capitalism human beings 
cannot be the masters, whether individually or collectively, of 
their own fate, even within the sphere where that fate is a 
product solely of human action. 
                                                        
37 See Marx & Engels, note 32 at at 123. 
38 See Iring Fetscher, Karl Marx und der Marxismus: Von der Ökonomiekritik zur Weltanschauung 
(4th ed. Munich: Piper, 1985) at 60. 
39 Allen W. Wood, Karl Marx (2d. ed. London: Routledge, 2004) at 49. 
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By contrast, human emancipation would establish joint control over the quasi-
natural objective relationships created by the antagonistic co-operation within 
the economic sphere.  Indeed, in an ideal society everyone would be doing his 
or her bit at various stations in the division of labor on the basis of insight into 
what is in the interest of all.40 Its realization presupposes, evidently, a full 
reconciliation of the political and the private sides of our social existence.  
Socialism represents, if anything, the project of overcoming or channeling 
competition by means of exercising, in one way or another, joint control over 
production and distribution. Several reasons can be invoked in favor of 
socialism. The reason that Marx tried to elicit from his analysis of capital was 
that owing to capitalism’s propensity to crises an association of producers 
would arrange for a more effective and less wasteful way of producing goods 
and satisfying needs.41 But it is conceivable to support socialism for different 
reasons, for example, on the ground that a socialist society would have power 
to curb social inequality and put an end to the absurdity with which an 
advanced market economy generates hitherto unknown “needs”.42 There is 
one perspective on socialism, however, that is most congenial to the 
libertarian strand of capitalism. From this perspective, the emancipatory 
appeal of socialism resides in its potential to replace a system of man-made 
necessity with the joint political control over a common life.43 Socialism would 
mark humanity’s exodus from the disempowering effect of second nature 
towards a world of collective self-government. 
Marx’s idea of human emancipation is the perhaps greatest idea of the 
modern world for the simple reason that it consistently elaborates the ideal of 
                                                        
40 See Deutsche Ideologie, note 35 at  33. 
41 See merely, James A. Caporaso & David P. Levine, Theories of Political Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992) at 70-72. 
42 See Erich Fromm, To Have or to Be? (New York: Harper and Row, 1976) at 163-164. 
43 For a fine reconstruction of this point, see Wood, note 39 at 49-50. As is well known, the 
presentation of socialism in terms of freedom enraged Friedrich August von Hayek. See his The 
Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 1991; first edition 1944) at 19-20. 
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freedom, extending it to the control of the circumstances that emerge as the 
unintended consequence of human practice. In its significance it is 
comparable to what Plato’s republic stands for in the context of ancient 
philosophy. It is comparable, I hasten to add, to this formidable work also 
owing to the problematic feature that they share. Both raise the questions 
whether the envisaged unity of social co-operation can be realized only at the 
cost of most serious oppression. Really existing socialism has taught a quite 
disheartening lesson. Communism, at any rate, no longer looks attractive after 
Stalin, Ceaușescu or Honecker have left their mark on a formerly noble 
aspiration (not to mention Pol Pot or Kim Il-sung). 
 
The dilemma 
It needs to be recognized, however, that the inclination towards 
authoritarianism is not an accidental feature of human emancipation. It is not 
only the case that due to some contingent circumstances of human action and 
human imperfection the realisation of the ideal cannot live up to the ideal 
itself (“Theory is Marx, practice a mess” – “Die Theorie ist Marx, die Praxis ist 
Murks”). The realization of human emancipation reveals a deeper 
predicament. The full realization of freedom as imagined by moderns, 
manifest in individual freedom of choice and of expression, presupposes 
freedom as understood by the ancients, who prefer collective self-
determination even where it rides roughshod over what liberals believe to be 
individual rights.44 Apparently, the totality of human freedom is at war with 
itself. It suffers, borrowing Hirschman’s felicitous phrase, from a propensity 
to self-subversion.  
                                                        
44 On this contrast, see Constant, note 11 at 311-312. 
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Revolutionary socialists understood that the “leap” towards the realm of 
freedom could not be made by waiting, as Karl Kautsky suggested, until the 
historical development of capitalism would reach the point at which it would 
invariably and automatically transform itself into a system of common 
political control of production and distribution. Lukács, for example, believed 
that capitalism, if it failed to somehow perpetuate itself, would lead to 
outright desolation and destruction.45  But the inevitable revolutionary action 
could also not rely on the actual proletariat or other groups of society whose 
minds were poisoned with the false consciousness that the capitalist society 
creates in its subjects.46 The intentions of the working class, even though 
unconsciously aiming at the right thing, are tarnished by a lack of self-
transcendence that the proletariat has to enact as the last class of human 
history.47 It must not merely pursue its own interest, but the interest of 
humankind. In Lukács view, it would therefore have also been a vain hope to 
expect, as Rosa Luxemburg did,48 that the revolution would be precipitated 
“organically” by the local resistance merging into one large socialist 
movement supported by the working class and other disadvantaged groups.49 
According to Lukács, the proletarian revolution, unlike other revolutions in 
human history, would have remained impossible had it not used the soviets 
qua “proletarian state”. This state would be the instrument of a vanguard 
party whose acts are to be based upon the objectively possible class-
consciousness of the proletariat.50  
The quest for human emancipation is therefore burdened with the 
“organizational question” (Organisationsfrage). It addresses the perplexing fact 
                                                        
45 See Georg Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein: Studien über marxistische Dialektik (10th 
ed., Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1988) at 436, 477-479. 
46 See ibid. at 124, 126. 
47 See ibid. at 157. 
48 See Rosa Luxemburg, Schriften zur Theorie der Spontaneität (ed. S. Hillmann, Reinbek: Rowohlt, 
1970) at 158-159. 
49 See Lukács, note 45 at 439-440, 447. 
50 See ibid. at 128, 152-153, 434-435,  
Alexander Somek 
19   
 
that a movement that is deeply committed to the equal freedom of all has to 
embrace the submission of those on whose behalf emancipation is to be 
effected. The vanguard party is the resolution of a prisoner’s dilemma 
constituted by the false consciousness concerning the right aspirations and by 
a false confidence in an “organic” transition towards socialism. Lukács was 
perhaps the most articulate defender of this idea. In the face of the danger of 
“opportunist” backsliding by social democrats, the party would serve as the 
trailblazer of emancipation, fully aware of the fact that revolutionary class 
consciousness was not an empirical matter but a perspective which to adopt 
was right on the ground of insight into the development of history.51 
Resolving the organizational question presupposes, however, agents that 
possess an intuitive understanding.52 They have to have a grasp of the present 
and future totality in order to arrive at the particulars and to determine how 
everything fits into a larger whole. This type of intellect would not only be 
able to arrive at the objective consciousness of the new class and to discern it 
from the false consciousness of the bourgeoisie and the masses; it would also 
be capable of anticipating what the needs and interests of human beings 
would be once the masses had made the transition. The vanguardness of the 
vanguard party consists precisely in its ability to anticipate what the good life 
would be for the people whom it is supposed to emancipate and who, after 
emancipation, would freely endorse what they may not have endorsed 
before.53 In its actions it bears semblance to a doctor who inflicts pain on her 
patients because the pain is necessary to overcome the condition under which 
pain is felt in the first place.  
                                                        
51 See ibid. at 128. 
52 On the notion of the “intuitive understanding”, see Eckart Förster, The Twenty-Five Years of 
Philosophy (trans. B. Bowman, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012) at 144, 148.  
53 Ironically, Hayek’s rant against submission to the discretionary power of planners did not even 
confront the fact that the vanguard party had to claim to act in interests that necessarily had to 
be unbeknownst to the subjects of emancipation. See Hayek, note 43 at 48-50, 69 
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Resolving the organizational question presupposes also according precedence 
to ancient over modern liberty. This concerns, in particular, the participants in 
the vanguard project. The party needs to be governed by strong camaraderie 
and cannot have time for long-winding discussions or open opposition to its 
leadership.54 The conscious decision in favor of the realm of freedom 
implicates a waiver of individual liberty in the bourgeois sense. A new type of 
freedom would be reconciled with solidarity. The synthesis of freedom and 
solidarity is “discipline”.55 Moreover, participation in the vanguard 
presupposes a total devotion to the cause that is reminiscent of Rousseau’s 
aliénation totale. Being part of the vanguard implies the “Aufgehen der 
Gesamtpersönlichkeit”56 in the practice of the movement. The merging with the 
movement prefigures the freedom that is attained as a consequence of human 
emancipation. It transcends the distinction between rights and obligations. 
Rights would be understood to be means for doing the right thing.  
According to Lukács, the “dialectical” process of the development of the 
working class as a whole depends on the organizational separateness of the 
“conscious” vanguard from the merely unconsciously revolutionary masses.57 
Undoubtedly, the masses that are not part of the vanguard party will 
experience the rule by the party exactly in the manner in which Constant 
described the effect of ancient liberty on people who want to be free in the 
modern sense, namely as tyranny.58 Indeed, Lukács emphasizes that, in its 
revolutionary role,59 freedom cannot be an end in itself, but has to serve the 
dictatorship of the proletariat as an entirely sovereign form60 of rule.61 The 
                                                        
54 See Lukács, note 45 at 445. 
55 See ibid. at 480-481. 
56 Ibid at 486. 
57 See ibid. at 512. 
58 See Constant, note 11 at 310, 318. 
59 See Lukács, note 45 at 447. 
60 The sovereignty of this dictatorship is also manifest in the fact that the vanguard party 
constitutes itself on the basis of its own free choice. See ibid. at 499-500. 
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vanguard party must have the flexibility, acumen and room for maneuver to 
adapt its policies and strategies to the exigencies of the situation.62 Hence, the 
class-unconscious masses will experience the rule of the party as terror and 
despotism for they can at any time be “interrogated, dismissed, condemned, 
beggared, exiled or sentenced to death by [their] magistrates and superiors.”63 
They end up necessarily alienated from the polity because the one reason 
does not apply to them that the ancients had for accepting the tough love of 
ancient liberty, namely the “compensatory” experience of being personally 
important to the polity and to take an active role in its life.64 The masses enjoy 
neither modern nor ancient liberty.  
It is important to note which conclusions do not follow from this analysis. 
First, insight into the predicament of human emancipation, which replicates 
the conflict between ancient and modern liberty, does not solve the problem 
that emancipation was designed to solve. In other words, in the face of its 
failure, the need for emancipation persists even if the most straightforward 
way to attain it is irreconcilable with the type of beings we take ourselves to 
be. Second, Constant senses that while ancient liberty was unfit for modern 
individuals it was conceivable to imagine a form of political liberty that is 
right for them, namely, representative democracy.65 It cannot be ruled out yet 
that an equivalent substitute can be found for human emancipation.  
So far we have only examined the first horn of the dilemma. Embracing 
human emancipation directly is likely leading to tyranny. The freedom-
                                                                                                                                                              
61 See Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur: Von den Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum 
proletarischen Klassenkampf (reprint, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1978) at 145-146. See, for 
example, on freedom of the press as a tool of socialist progress, Vladimir Illitch Lenin, ‘Die 
nächsten Aufgaben der Sovietmacht’ In Für und wider die Bürokratie: Schriften und Briefe 1917-
1923 (Reinbek: Rohwolt, 1970) at 42. 
62 See Lukács, note 45 at 450. This did not escape Hayek’s attention. See note Hayek, note 43 at 
48-49.  
63 Constant, note 11 at 312. 
64 See ibid. at 316, 320. 
65 See ibid. 325-327. 
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denying effects of a market economy, however, do not disappear simply 
because the remedy is also freedom-denying. The problem does not go away 
simply because one or another solution does not work. At the same time, we 
have conceded to Marx that the politically emancipated economy constitutes a 
threat to freedom. In light of the dubious value of the remedy it cannot be 
wrong to reconsider what one has to believe in order to consider capitalism a 
threat to freedom. The focus needs to shift, therefore, to the second horn. It 
pays to re-examine capitalism sine ira et studio before we return to the question 
if and how the European Union fits into the story of human emancipation. 
 
Capitalism: The value of choice 
One of the cardinal principles of the European economy—and of the capitalist 
system in general—is competition. In the case of the Union, the commitment 
to competition has been particularly strongly pronounced during the pursuit 
of the so-called “Lisbon Strategy. It was supposed to raise the Union to the 
level of the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy of the 
world.66 But even aside from this effort, which has been superseded by the 
more muted “Europe 2020 Strategy”, competition has always been embraced 
by the Union because of its supposedly overall beneficial effects. Competition 
is believed to foster economic growth and to benefit the consumer.67  
Competitiveness is an essential ingredient of the capitalist system and a 
consequence of the decentralized mode of resource allocation.68 The epitome 
of decentralization is the right to private property. It signals that private 
                                                        
66 See, Presidency Conclusions, 24 March 2000. 
67 This, at any rate, it the normative principle invoked by neoclassical economic philosophy. See 
Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself (2d. ed. New York: Free Press, 
1993) at 81. 
68 See Hayek, note 43 at 27-30. 
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actors, rather than more or less centralized political bodies, decide on matters 
such as investment, consumption or saving. If allocative decisions are 
decentralized everyone needs to be heeded of the decisions of others.  
The basic paradox of capitalism consists in the fact that while its decentralized 
mode of production and distribution operates on the basis of free choice it 
gives also rise to a life governed by necessity.69 The term “necessity” denotes 
both the context and the quality of demands. They arise from the life process 
and command our attention with the unwelcome urgency characteristic of 
physical drives.70 Admittedly, the latter is only true if human beings are 
indeed hungry in anticipation of future hunger;71 but economic rationality is 
indeed the means to represent temporally remote urgency today. Prudence 
can be quite dictatorial. Responsible parents, for example, invest time and 
money in the human capital of their children. Otherwise their offspring 
would scarcely be able to live and prosper in a competitive world. Children 
have to be molded into “ability-machines”.72 In anticipation of the necessities 
that they will have to respond to they need to possess a variety of marketable 
skills. It is imperative, therefore, to send them to math camp or even to a 
school in a foreign country. This is all the more so as one has to reckon that 
others are going to do the same. A competitive life is a life spent on engaging 
in pre-emptive strikes. The requisite functional necessities originate from “the 
hard discipline of the market”.73 
Since, under competitive conditions, people are not in control of their options, 
their skills and plans had better be adjustable to various alternatives. 
                                                        
69 See Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Die Deutsche Ideologie, MEW vol 3. (Berlin: Dietz, 1978) at 
76. 
70 See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958) 71-73. 
71 See Thomas Hobbes, De Homine 10/3. 
72 See Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-79 (trans. G. 
Burchell, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2008) at 229. 
73 Friedrich August von Hayek, ‘Individualism: True and False’ In Individualism and Economic 
Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948) 1-32 at 24. 
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Evidently, given the vagaries of markets, life cannot be lived pursuant to one 
existential project or according to an individual “plan”. It is subject to the 
incessant recurrence of smart choices between and among non-chosen 
options.74 Advocates of a free society75 do not see a problem in this. What 
matters to them is that as long as one is not coerced into doing or forbearing 
something one is free regardless of whether one finds the options 
unattractive.76  
This is, however, counterintuitive. Someone who does not find his preferred 
Leberknödelsuppe on the menu may be still given a choice between a 
hamburger and stew. Alas, for someone who would rather eat 
Leberknödelsuppe, but is not free to have one, the choice between a hamburger 
and stew is of no value. This is a basic problem that the advocates of a free 
society ignore. They do so, perhaps, for the simple reason that in their view 
the value of choices resides in choosing itself. After all, choosing is preceded 
by some exercise of human rationality. This may be the value that advocates 
of a free society truly endorse. It may explain why we have reason to believe 
that in their view there can never be a choice without value. Is it not better to 
have a choice between hamburger or stew than being forced into eating one 
or the other? The difference is of moral significance. Hence, freedom appears 
to be preserved so long as people are given some choice.77 So long as workers 
can choose between a physically or a sexually abusive employer they are 
better off than they would be if they were forced into working for either.78 The 
explanation is that in making a choice they are free to take their relative 
                                                        
74 See Ulrich Bröckling, Das unternehmerische Selbst: Soziologie einer Subjektivierungsform 
(Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, 2007) at 88, 106. 
75 Since irony is no longer noticed I emphasize that “advocates of a free society” signifies 
believers in laissez fair capitalism, such as Milton Friedman. 
76 This is clearly revealed in Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (2d. ed., Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982) at 14-15; see also Hayek, note 73 at 24. 
77 See Hayek, note 73 at 16, 24. 
78 See, ibid., at 15. This is not Hayek’s example! 
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disutility into account.79 One must wonder, hence, whether the hullabaloo 
about interrogation methods, such as waterboarding, would subside if the 
subjects were given a choice between immersion into water or the 
administration of electric shocks. We shall return to this point below. 
Be that as it may, it is nonetheless true that a market economy can 
dramatically reduce the range of options if one focuses not on recurring 
singular choices but on various ways of leading a whole life over time. Indeed, 
reasoning as a clever market participant does not involve reasoning about life 
but rather the recurrent choices that are mostly informed by the calculation of 
marginal utility. If anything at all lends coherence to life then it is the formal 
maxim of maximization. 
 
Politics and the rule of the few 
Assume that a substantial number of the working members of society wish to 
allocate an equal amount of their daily time to working and to spending time 
with their family. Imagine that they live in a community where a smaller 
number of people busy themselves with leading excessively productive lives. 
In a competitive business environment it is to be expected that the incidence 
of this smaller number will raise the bar of achievement for everyone. 
Consequently, a substantially larger number of people will see themselves 
                                                        
79 I add, in passing, that this was one of the reasons why the American realist legal theorist 
Robert Hale believed that all market exchanges are coerced exchanges. Ordinarily, a situation of 
coercion does not involve the physical incapacity to do otherwise on the part of the coerced 
subject, but rather leaves this subject with a choice between unpalatable alternatives. A robber 
leaves one with the choice to hand over one’s purse or to be killed. Similarly, an employer leaves 
the unemployed with a choice to starve or to work for a pittance. On Hale’s view, see the 
illuminating discussion by Barbara H. Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire: Robert Hale 
and the First Law and Economics Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988) 
at 49-50. 
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confronted with the necessity of having to alter their time allocation in order 
to make a living. They are de facto less free to spend time with their family. 
This freedom-denying consequence of competition did not escape the 
attention of Hayek. Almost gleefully, he exposed the inequities of a market 
economy, but only in order to dismiss them as irrelevant:80  
Competition is, after all, always a process in which a smaller 
number makes it necessary for larger numbers to do what they 
do not like, be it to work harder, to change habits, or to devote 
a degree of attention, continuous application, or regularity to 
their work which without competition would not be needed. 
Of course, the substantial number of people, by virtue of being the democratic 
majority, may want to decide to introduce a rule that limits the amount of 
time that may be spent on productive pursuits, for example, by limiting the 
regular working time. The smaller group would likely claim, aided and 
abetted by the advocates of a free society,81 that such a rule constitutes an 
offence to individual liberty. But, remarkably enough, the rule adopted by the 
majority is not only perfectly legitimate from a democratic point of view; it is 
also apt to restore the liberty of the majority that they have lost because they 
had to adapt to a situation created by a few. Hence, what advocates of a free 
society really demand is that the majority yield to the minority that puts their 
liberty to a productive use. These advocates are, if anything, not neutral 
between and among various human forms of enjoying liberty. Hayek has 
always been quite outspoken about this:82 
[T]he merit of competition is precisely that it gives the minority 
a chance to prevail. Where it can do so without any coercive 
powers, it ought always to have the right. 
                                                        
80 Friedrich August von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty vol. 3: The Political Order of a Free 
People (2d. ed., London: Routledge, 1982) at 77. I hasten to add that the ostensible immoralism of 
Hayek’s theory is actually a mitigating factor. 
81 See Friedman, note 76 at 8, 11. 
82 Note 138 at 30. 
Alexander Somek 
27   
 
Translated into political terms this means that the few indirectly rule over the 
many. Competition creates a trajectory for social oligarchy. 
 
Nobody’s responsibility 
Advocates of a free society will point out that there is a difference between 
those constraints on liberty that are imposed by political institutions and 
others that arise as mere side-effects of the general exercise of liberty.83 It is 
one thing to prohibit the sale of Aperol, but quite another if Aperol is not 
supplied in stores owing to inexistent consumer demand. Whereas the former 
may well be objectionable, the latter is not.  
The force of this reply can be drawn out in at least two different ways.  
Adopting a rule against competitive behavior is a political choice. A choice of 
this type is always contested, not least because it is likely to implicate private 
autonomy. By contrast, if matters are left to the market, constraints emerge as 
an aggregate effect of individual acts that are not intended as restrictions.84 If 
Aperol is not in supply because virtually nobody cares about the product then 
the person constrained from buying it has nobody to blame. Who is 
responsible for the overall composition of consumer preferences? Nobody. 
Since consumers at large have decided not to buy a product, owners of shops 
have not ordered it. None of them, however, intended to bring about a 
situation in which Aperol is generally unavailable on the market. Neither 
individuals nor a collective body have made this choice. Nobody interfered 
with the interest of the consumer. Nobody bears any responsibility. This is the 
way of the world.  
                                                        
83 See, in this vein, Friedman, note 76 at 11. 
84 See Hayek, note 43 at 15, 70, where Hayek points out that prices are not determined by a 
“conscious will”. 
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Even though this elaboration of the reply is not terribly sophisticated, it 
nevertheless explains the appeal that market solutions have to those who are 
averse to being burdened with demands made by others. Markets are a way 
of disposing of responsibility. If things go wrong because of markets then 
there is a strong prima facie case that there is nobody to blame. Markets are not 
agents.85 They are media for the co-ordination of individual conduct. 
Therefore, market solutions depoliticize. They create side-constraints on 
everybody for whose existence nobody can be held to account.86 Likewise, any 
adverse situation that people may find themselves in is more easily borne by 
them if this situation is not the direct result of allocative decisions. Inequality 
is more readily accepted if it stems from the impersonal forces that reflect the 
competitive efforts of many.87  
This reply is still incomplete. It does not address the question why a 
community that would be capable of adopting rules would still choose to 
abstain from adopting collective choices and let markets run their course. The 
justification for such an abstention may be manifold and may draw, for 
example, on the wealth-generating effects of the “spontaneous” orderings that 
emerge from free exchanges.88 True advocates of a free society, however, 
would have to point out why and how such an abstention is consistent with 
                                                        
85 See Friedrich August von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice 
(2d. ed. London: Routledge, 1993) at 70, where Hayek explains that the “impersonal process of 
the market” can be neither just nor unjust “because the results are not intended or forseen, and 
depend on a multitude of circumstances not known in their totality to anybody”. See also Hayek, 
note 43 at 15, 57, who is, however, guilty of conflating impartiality with indifference. The market 
operates with indifference as regards the needs of particular individuals, but this does not mean 
that the distribution is impartial with regard to the “usefulness” (to use Hayek’s term) of 
products in the eyes of those who can afford them. The market very partially rewards those who 
are able to motivate others to pay for what they do. That Hayek mistakes impartiality for 
indifference is also evident from his remark that one is impartial if one does not have an answer 
to a certain question.  
86 This is not to say that the advocates of a free society would not see a role for political choices 
when it comes to unintended collective consequences that threaten to subvert the smooth 
functioning of market transactions. Hence, a free society can well be described as a “risk society”, 
that is, a society that needs to assess and manage the collective risks to which its existence gives 
rise. See, generally, See Ulrich Beck, World at Risk (trans. Ciaran Cronin, Cambridge: Polity, 2009). 
87 See Hayek, note 43 at 79-80. 
88 See Hayek, note 85 at 114-115. 
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liberty. Hence, a somewhat better elaboration of the reply would emphasize, 
at the outset, that any individual action always takes place in the face of 
circumstances beyond the agent’s control. Nobody is ever unconstrained. The 
question is, therefore, which type of constraint is more consistent with liberty, 
that is, constraints that originate either from political choices or from 
aggregate market effects.  
The advocates of a free society will likely point out that political choices 
directly subordinate the will of one human being to the will of another. It is in 
this vein that they will also reply to the hypothetical in which an individual is 
confronted with a choice between water-boarding and electro shocks. Even 
though there is a choice, it is still a choice between two different coercive acts. 
Both options imply the subordination of one human being to another. Options 
that arise from the “impersonal” operation of the market, by contrast, do not 
carry the implication of subordination. Rather, they are the outcome of a 
competitive process that is as “blindfolded” as justice due to its “impersonal” 
nature.89 Consequently, if someone were, for want of resources, confronted 
with either having to suffer starvation or selling a kidney on the market for 
organ transplants, this would be the person’s free choice since neither of the 
options involves an act of external coercion. It follows that advocates of a free 
society actually accept the claim that the value of having a choice is also a 
function of the value of options. They would insist, however, that the only 
vehicle for arriving at the relevant valuations is to examine whether the 
options have emerged from the “impersonal” competitive process.90  
 
                                                        
89 See Hayek, note 43 at 76. 
90 Of course, advocates of a free society hasten to add that the range of choice would be greater in 
such a society that it could ever be under conditions of economic planning. See Hayek, note 43 at 
70-71. 
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Private collective self-determination 
Political choices interfere with the private autonomy of those who are 
defeated in a vote. A system that favors market solutions, by contrast, 
supposedly gives private autonomy its due. Accepting the constraints that 
originate as a cumulative effect of market transactions is how one pays respect 
to the free choices of others.91 Hence, the majority of people who have to work 
harder under competitive conditions because a smaller number has raised the 
bar of achievement thereby recognizes, normatively, the existence of private 
autonomy under conditions of reciprocity. Consequently, the limits on 
opportunities that one experiences in a free society are particular instances of 
a certain form of collective self-determination. It is the collective self-
determination among individuals who use contracts to co-ordinate their 
actions and do not address the cumulative side-effects to which these actions 
give rise.  
Generally, one is collectively self-determining if one allows oneself to be 
determined by an entity other than oneself of which one is, nonetheless, 
part.92 If everyone conceives of him- or herself as one market participant 
among equal others and, therefore, identifies with being active within a web of 
horizontal transactions one is self-determining inasmuch as one is part of the 
web in every instance in which one readily adapts to the situation created by 
the web. As a matter of reciprocity, whatever is done by someone within the 
web counts as what could have been done by oneself. Consequently, 
aggregate effects are not alien, they are the social manifestation of the private 
autonomy of all to whom one belongs as an equal. This private form of 
collective self-determination universalizes the disjointed co-existence of 
                                                        
91 See Hayek, note 85 at 120-121, where Hayek explains that those who suffer from the effects of 
new competition have already been the beneficiaries of a prior competitive situation. Hence, this 
is a justification of competition that draws on reciprocity.  
92 More precisely put, it presupposes the identity of identity and difference. 
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individuals. The “compulsion of circumstance”93 is therefore jointly 
authorized by individuals who co-ordinate their actions horizontally but do 
not co-operate vertically in order to address them. People who experience 
themselves as disempowered by circumstance while conceiving of themselves 
as private individuals merely encounter their own will: volenti non fit iniuria. 
Their circumstances are mediated by the “impersonal” mechanism of the 
market, which, rightly understood, reflects collective private self-
determination, i.e., the mutual recognition of private autonomy. Its 
impartiality is actually indifference with regard to how market situations 
affect individual lives. It overrides moral intuitions concerning well-being or 
justice that might beset people when they learn about ill-fated neighbors or 
friends.94  
From that perspective, it can be seen that Marxists were mistaken in 
describing the situation of labor as a lack of freedom or as a form of alienation 
without specifying any further what, for a situation of self-alienation to arise, a 
human being has to be taken to be.95 If human beings are essentially private 
(i.e., “individuals”) there is no meaningful way of establishing in which 
respect they are alienated from themselves given that humans signal through 
their participation in a web of transactions that they mutually recognize one 
another’s private autonomy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
93 See Hayek, note 43 at 19. 
94 See ibid. at 92-93. 
95 Of course, Marxists always assumed that there was more to freedom than private autonomy. 
See Wood, note 39 at 50. 
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The impression of naturalness and the improvement 
imperative 
One might suspect that this somewhat better elaboration of the reply to the 
challenge of democratic decision-making is vulnerable to an objection. 
Doesn’t such a collective individualism tacitly favor that form of life which is 
likely to prevail under competitive conditions? Whoever possesses sufficient 
flexibility and stamina is likely to succeed. Indeed, if people want to keep 
their head above the water they have to have two properties, the possession 
of which is a duty towards themselves: agility and adaptability.96 While it is 
clear that not everyone will be able to develop these properties equally, they 
are still not part of every way of leading a life. Many versions of living a 
meaningful life are more contemplative. They are difficult to sustain under 
conditions of economic liberalism. It would appear, therefore, that economic 
liberalism is tacitly illiberal.97  
This objection would be entirely ill-founded if it were true that there is no 
alternative way of being neutral among ways of life than the competitive 
order. The market would then simply represent the “right” type of order.98 
Indeed, for a steadfast defender of the market economy the guidance that 
people obtain from prices bespeaks a voice of reason that is incapable of being 
articulated by, or embodied in, any human being or any group.99 Quoting 
from Hayek:100 
                                                        
96 See my ‘The Social Question in a Transnational Context’ LSE European Institute Working Paper, 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSPapers.aspx. 
97 This objection is empirically sound. Yet, the advocates of a free society could still reply that 
agile and adaptable people might be confronted with the same dilemma were they to find 
themselves in a society of slackers. They would be shunned by everyone else and willy-nilly 
forced to live like everyone else. Nevertheless, what competition does is that it homogenizes. And 
it forces people to cater to the projects of others.  
98 See Hayek, note 85 at 115-120. 
99 See ibid., at 116 
100 Note 73 at 15. 
Alexander Somek 
33   
 
[…] [H]uman Reason, with a capital R, does not exist in the 
singular, as given or available to any particular person, as the 
rationalist approach seems to assume, but must be conceived 
as an interpersonal process in which anyone’s contribution is 
tested and corrected by others. 
Only the decentralized co-ordination of choices can help everyone to achieve 
what they desire. Adaptation to necessities means doing the right thing. 
The elevation of the competitive markets to the state of natural law101 must, 
however, fail unless it is supported by an attractive normative principle.102 
Remarkably enough, markets obscure this link to a justification. As has long 
been observed by Marx,103 market relationships are surrounded with an aura 
of naturalness. The existence of commodities and prizes lends man-made 
social relationships the appearance of relations among things,104 for example, 
as the relation between a “job” and a required set of “skills”.  
The apparent naturalness of the market leaves its mark on how people 
exercise their freedom. In any competitive context the key to success is being 
better than others (“improve or die”). People not only have no choice of their 
options, they even need to make a special effort to excel at what man-made 
necessity leaves them little choice but to do. In a situation where not only 
resources but also consumer demand is scarce, demand needs to be 
generated. Banks, for example, have become particularly inventive at offering 
customers services that they could have never imagined themselves. But once 
the service has been invented, human greed makes it almost irresistible. 
                                                        
101 Hayek, note 85 59-60, expressed reservation as regards classifying his evolutionary approach 
to order as natural law. However, since Hayek clearly seeks to obtain normative guidance from 
the type of order that is characteristic of markets, it makes sense to refer to his approach as a 
natural law theory. 
102 In the case of Hayek it is difficult to see whether his celebration of markets is based on the 
normative principle that on average and in the long term everyone is likely to be better off or on 
the admiration for the type of being that a market is. If the latter were the case, Hayek would 
provide us with a normative ontology of the market economy, which must strike one as an almost 
medieval undertaking. 
103 See Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Marx-Engels-Werke (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1968) vol. 23 at 100.  
104 See Georg Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein. Studien über marxistische Dialektik (10th 
ed., Neuwied: Luchterhand 1988) at 174. 
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Technology, owing to its cunning appeal to the infantile parts of our soul, is 
highly successful at creating necessities that profoundly alter our lives. This is 
part of capitalism’s erotic appeal. The reward for having permanently to 
improve in random tasks resides in enjoying the unexamined life of the 
consumer of gadgets and other amenities of life. Capitalism is as brutal as it is 
charmingly shallow.  
 
The world of individuals 
The somewhat better elaboration of the reply would have us perceive 
situations that are the aggregate effect of voluntary transactions as endorsed 
by the collective self-determination of individuals who do not live in 
community with, but merely among, others. This self-determination is 
mediated by reciprocity. Everyone could be in anyone’s position in the web of 
transactions. In addition, the somewhat better elaboration would also find 
political choices unobjectionable if they were taken unanimously.105 This is 
tantamount to reducing the political to the private. Such a reductionism is 
nowhere more clearly articulated than in how Friedman explains the meaning 
of political freedom:106 
Political freedom means the absence of coercion of a man by his 
fellow men. 
This is an outright equation of political with private freedom. Nowhere is it 
more evident that matters such as speaking in public, campaigning and 
voting are not on the radar screen of the advocates of a free society (campaign 
contributions are, to be sure).  
                                                        
105 Quite tellingly, Hayek, note 43 at 45, 47, argues against the democratic control of the economy 
by pointing out that there would not be enough agreement on economic matters even tough it 
would be necessary for parliament to exercise a steering function.  
106 Friedman, note 76 at 15. 
Alexander Somek 
35   
 
Besides self-reliant adaptation to market situations, unanimous voting is the 
other form of collective self-determination that is compatible with private 
freedom. While the first is indirect and endorses situations because they arise 
as a consequence of a web of transactions, the second is direct (and raises the 
specter of collective responsibility).107 They are not on an equal footing. It is 
not likely that people will unanimously agree on how to alter the 
circumstances of their choices in order to align them with how they want to 
live. Given the diversity of human temperaments and plans such a vote 
would hardly ever be taken. Hence, individuals, owing to their isolation, are 
destined to enjoy their freedom of choice in adaptation to non-chosen 
circumstances. If they were to examine their life as a potential whole they 
would possibly find themselves faced with the prospect of living how they do 
not want to live even though this could be changed by political means. 
Respect for the private autonomy of others, however, puts such a change de 
facto out of reach.  
This suggests that paying respect to private autonomy consistently exacts 
public autonomy as its price. Advocates of a free society, however, do not 
perceive a loss. For ontological reasons, political self-determination is quite 
inconceivable for them. In their view, collective self-determination is always 
self-determination by individuals and comes in two forms: first, adaption to 
markets, since this reconciles individual freedom of choice with the same 
freedom of equal others; or, second, unanimous decisions.  
 
 
                                                        
107 What is remarkable about the first form of collective self-determination is that it endorses 
something that is not willed by anyone. It is fundamentally passive, in contrast to political self-
determination that involves the passive acceptance of what is willed by others.  
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Hegel’s insight: Authority by virtue of necessity  
Unanimity can be mediated by a concurrence of either desires or insights. 
While the former are by definition individual possessions, the latter are 
socially conditioned. The knowledge that can underpin and necessitate 
unanimous decisions is substantially and formally “social” in its nature.  
First, insight into the socially conditioned nature of individual pursuits 
requires the recognition of some form of authority that stabilizes the mutually 
beneficial web of interactions. As Hegel famously explained:108 
The selfish end in its actualization, conditioned in this way by 
universality, establishes a system of all-round interdependence, 
so that the subsistence [Subsistenz] and welfare of the 
individual [des Einzelnen] and his rightful existence [Dasein] 
are interwoven with, and grounded on, the subsistence, welfare 
and rights of all, and have actuality and security only in this 
context. – One may regard in the first instance as the external 
state, the state of necessity and of the understanding.   
Hegel’s Not- und Verstandesstaat, the intellectual promulgation of which he 
attributes the contractualist tradition from Hobbes to Fichte, is underpinned 
by individual insight into what is instrumentally necessary in order to sustain 
a life of recurrent maximizing choices that involve the mutual recognition of 
choices made by others. The insight into the necessity of authority is socially 
mediated in that it recognizes the integrity of the web of transactions as a 
necessary condition of freedom of choice. It reveals that such freedom is 
socially constituted and sustained.  
Second, insight itself is socially mediated formally in that knowing is a social 
activity, not only in the sense that knowledge becomes more solid if tested 
through the exchange of experience and argument, but also in the sense that 
one depends for one’s own knowledge vitally on the knowledge of others. 
                                                        
108 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (trans. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) at 221 (§ 183). 
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These others are often in a better position to know things than one is oneself. 
Individuals understand that people with expertise have to have a say on 
matters concerning the integrity of market transactions and the management 
of risks. Consequently, the rise of administrative authority is a built-in feature 
of a free society. People gladly defer to who can rightfully claim to have better 
knowledge for it lifts various burdens off their shoulders. The concurrent 
deference of individuals serves as a substitute of unanimous voting on the 
basis of insight. It is knowledge of no knowledge combined with the 
recognition that things have to be done by people who know how to do 
things well. Public problems become resolved, therefore, not on the basis of 
political choices but on the ground of whatever purports to be greater 
insight.109 Rational deference is the bedrock of the administrative state. Its 
claim to authority rests on the idea that insight into their limited knowledge 
and problem-solving capacity gives people a reason to yield to the 
determinations made by expert bodies.110 
Authority by virtue of necessity—the Not- und Verstandesstaat—is an extension 
of the collective private self-determination of individuals. This must not be 
mistaken for political self-determination, which, by contrast, also involves 
yielding to the determination of others (or to one’s own determination in a 
political capacity). What reconciles, in the case of political self-determination, 
the passivity of being determined with the activity of determining is not 
seeing oneself as part of a web of transactions but rather as a part of a place 
shared with concrete others.111 This presupposes a conception of sociality that 
is alien to the advocates of a free society, for they conceive of the web of 
market transactions not as a place. Subjects of various webs are, borrowing 
from Constant, “individuals, lost in an unnatural isolation, strangers to the 
                                                        
109 On the “police”, see ibid. at 260 (§ 231). 
110 This is not the whole story. See my forthcoming ‘Accidental Cosmopolitanism: Citizenship at 
the End of History’. 
111 See my ‘On Cosmopolitan Self-Determination’ (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 405-428. 
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place of their birth, without any contact with the past, living only in a hurried 
present, scattered like atoms on a vast plain.”112 Put differently, these webs are 
not polities. Conceiving of oneself as an element of a place, by contrast, 
requires seeing oneself as part of a whole that does not flow out into the 
infinity of horizontal transactions. It actually presupposes the use of the 
intuitive understanding in order to grasp a bounded totality.113  
 
Individual responsibility 
The type of ordering that is preferred by the advocates of a free society, even 
though not defended on the ground of some moral theory, is prone to foster a 
remarkably moralistic attitude. This has to do with the abdication of 
responsibility on the part of society, which is even considered to be a 
chimerical entity by some of its advocates.114  
If nobody is responsible for what happens on markets, the responsibility to 
influence or alter one’s situation and to exercise requisite foresight 
automatically devolves to the individual.115 This responsibility is unlimited. If 
your country goes bankrupt you are responsible to deal with the 
consequences affecting you because you could have decided to move to 
another country beforehand.  
It should be noted, however, that this type of “responsibility” is based on 
nothing other than the absence of social responsibility and the existence of 
some trivial instrumental relationship between individual wants and their 
satisfaction. Imagine, for example, that a party has littered a public picnic 
                                                        
112 Constant, note 11 at 255. 
113 For a further elaboration of this basically Goetheian idea, see Förster, note 52 at 256-259. 
114 See Hayek, note 98 at 70; Margaret Thatcher, Interview with Women’s Magazine, 31.10.1987, 
available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689.  
115 See Bröckling, note 74 at 93-94. 
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area. The next person wishing to enjoy it needs to clean up the mess that has 
been left by others. It is this person’s “responsibility” for the simple reason 
that nobody else wants the area to be clean. But this does not mean that the 
person has incurred an obligation towards others.  That people are 
responsible for themselves means only that they have to make an effort if they 
wish to do well. Young adults who struggle to obtain an education by doing 
hard work in order to be able to afford it merely clean up the mess that 
society has left for them.  
But this difference in the meaning of responsibility does not prevent the folks 
living in a free society from using individual responsibility in strongly 
normative terms. It helps to rationalize their lack of regard for others. People 
are responsible for their lot. They deserve to be in the situation that they are 
in.  
 
The heart of the matter 
I conclude these fragmentary observations concerning capitalism and 
freedom with a few hints as to how they could be usefully amended.  
First, the argument would benefit from an exploration of Robert Hale’s 
contention that the laws governing a market economy empower people to 
engage in coercion. Rather than being a zone governed by voluntary 
agreement, a market economy is basically a place where the have-nots 
eventually yield to threats.116  
                                                        
116 See Fried, note 79 at 56-57. 
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Second, Max Weber117 observed quite perceptively the existence of a 
functional equivalence between governance on the basis of authority and 
governance by creating situations in which people act in response to 
competitive pressures. Indeed, the process of governance is concealed from 
the governed so long as they believe to react merely to situations whose 
constitution cannot be imputed to anyone because they appear to be 
essentially side-effects (“externalities”). The latter form of governance may, 
indeed, be more conducive to the development of self-discipline. 
Furthermore, Weber also recognized that organized businesses are essential to 
economic survival in market economies. Hence, a need for “leadership” and 
hierarchy arises from their midst. This explains also why the Tories’ obsession 
with privilege and deference is compatible with the liberal support of free 
markets. While some are calling the shots, the large majority is forced to obey. 
Not by accident, hence, a capitalist economy used to be surrounded by an 
authoritarian air, at least until its harsh male tone was mitigated in the course 
of the revolution in communication.118 The authoritarianism has now largely 
been internalized into the maxim of permanent self-improvement, while 
unpleasant things are done to employees with an expression of regret. 
Third, looking beyond the problems of mere economic liberalism and 
extending the analysis to liberalism generally it would be necessary to take 
the profound work of the German philosopher Christoph Menke into 
account.119 In his view, liberal equality invariably collides with human 
freedom since it expects people to adjust their own good to what is 
compatible with a liberal conception of justice. The rules and principles of 
fairness expect people to adjust their good in light of contingent 
                                                        
117 See Max Weber, Economy and Society (trans. E. Fischoff et al., Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978) vol. 2 at 731. 
118 See Eva Illouz, Saving the Modern Soul: Therapy, Emotions, and the Culture of Self-Help 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) at 72-77. 
119 See, most notably, his Tragödie im Sittlichen: Gerechtigkeit und Freiheit nach Hegel (Frankfurt 
aM.: Suhrkamp 1996). 
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opportunities. Consequently, people are expected to dispose of their most 
authentic longings. Law and justice ignore the difference between how 
individuals experience their longings and how it casts them into the role of 
equal choosers.120 
Even though the analysis is incomplete, I conclude, nonetheless, with the 
confidence that the major point, which is a very elementary one, has emerged 
clearly enough.  
The first horn of the dilemma was that human emancipation appears to 
confront modern individuals with an overbearing demand for ancient liberty. 
The second horn consisted of the problem that gave rise to the desire for 
emancipation in the first place, namely the subordination of human beings to 
self-made necessity. It has now turned out that this necessity is experienced as 
heteronomy only if humans conceive of themselves as political beings.  
Contrary to what has been taken for granted by Marx, it is not clear yet why 
people would have reason to experience themselves as political beings (and, a 
fortiori, “as species beings”). This is all the more doubtful given that a 
capitalist society is capable of generating the type of individual that is 
compatible with it. This, at any rate, must have been the core idea underlying 
Marcuse’s concern with a whole syndrome of disempowerment.121 It arises 
when the advanced industrial society succeeds over the experience of 
alienation and absorbs all transcending forces by making them its own. The 
remaining energies of rebellion feed then into the reinforcement of conformity 
and submission. We shall return to this idea in the context of our discussion of 
empowerment. 
 
                                                        
120 See ibid. at 259-260, 296-298. 
121 See Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man. Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial 
Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964) at 9, 145. 
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The mute point of economic liberalism 
What advocates of a free society would have to concede, nonetheless, is that 
there is a clash between the “tough love” of individual responsibility, on the 
one hand, and rational insight into authority by virtue of necessity, on the 
other. Rational insight into the inevitability of permitting those who are in the 
know to rule our lives is always riddled with the paradox that it cannot 
determine where our ignorance has to come to an end. Under the impression 
of overwhelming complexity one is easily led to the conclusion that the scope 
for exercising one’s own judgment must be dramatically narrow. As a result, 
there is not only an inclination to concede to administrative bodies more 
authority than they perhaps deserve but consequently also increasing 
interference with private freedom by anonymous authorities that lack proper 
accountability. That the fate of states and their currencies is in the hand of 
rating agencies is a case in point. Evidently, private liberty has an 
authoritarian face when it comes to using socially validated insight for the 
benefit of all. 
Since neither members nor advocates of a free society can conceive of society 
as a collective entity there is no other way of establishing authority than by 
conventional yielding to this or that “site” with problem-solving authority. 
This matches the situation envisaged by the most radical proponent of legal 
pluralism. Various authorities exist side-by-side, but lack an anchor in one 
overarching constitutional framework.122 The anonymity of their constitution 
is inherited from the anonymous “authorship” of situations that arise as a 
result of market transactions. 
                                                        
122 See Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010) at 100. 
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In principle, the acceptance of authority by virtue of necessity is an extension 
of collective private self-determination. This includes concurrent and 
conventional individual deference to administrative bodies. However, since 
concurrent deference would not make any sense if it were not mediated by 
persons’ taking their cue from the deference that they observe in others, it also 
marks the moment at which private autonomy might turn into political 
autonomy. One does as all others do. The authority of sites is conventional. 
Conventions, however, are a not publicly reflected form of collective self-
determination among members of a group. This is revealed by the fact that if 
we explain what a convention demands we say that this is how “we” do 
things “here”. That is, once we get to conventions, we are reaching the ground 
of political self-determination. We posit a collective subject and a place. 
However, we do so entirely passively. We treat, when bringing the 
convention about, the convention as a given. We are entirely passive. That is, 
we do not perceive it as our product. Conventions are political liberty merely 
“in itself”. 
Transcending private self-determination may be necessary, ironically, in order 
to contain, if humanely possible, the self-subversive tendencies of capitalism 
which are not least manifest in the disconnect between the elite’s profit 
interest and the general interest in system survival.123 These tendencies may 
make it unavoidable to shoulder some joint responsibility. Whoever, 
therefore, moves beyond a system of government that merely combines free 
markets, the administration of justice and the regulation of risks—justice and 
administration being the hallmarks of the Not- und Verstandesstaat—leaves the 
                                                        
123 See Wolfgang Streeck, ‘Taking capitalism seriously: towards an institutionalist approach to 
contemporary political economy‘ (2011) 9 Socio-Economic Review 137-167, at 150-151, 158. 
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ideological precinct of economic liberalism.124 For such a move posits that, as 
mere market participants, people are alienated from their political being.125  
 
A not so dark European legacy 
Endorsing the priority of political over private freedom implies that in the 
respect that was most important to him, Hayek was wrong. It is not 
impossible to hold markets to account, in particular not for allegedly 
ontological reasons (“markets are not the kind of beings to which actions can 
be imputed”). Making markets responsible is a matter of creating 
governments that are responsible for markets. This is a trivial point. It is, 
nonetheless, of great significance, for it explains what has underpinned 
Western European social projects of the twentieth century. They were about 
finding a viable strategy for asserting the primacy of the political ordering of 
society without committing the fatal mistakes of “really existing socialism”. 
                                                        
124 To expect governments to do more than guarantee the integrity and functioning of private 
exchanges means to move beyond the sphere that Hegel reconstructed under the name of civil 
society. The idea of moving beyond economic liberalism is, however, driven by the hope that 
political freedom, even though ennobling in its own right, is able to restore the private freedom 
that people lose in a market society. This is the emancipatory promise that is shared by socialism 
and other forms of overcoming economic liberalism. The late Marx most famously described it in 
the following terms (Capital vol. 3): “In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where 
labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very 
nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must 
wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilised man, 
and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his 
development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same 
time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can 
only consist in socialised men, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange 
with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind 
forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions 
most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of 
necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true 
realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its 
basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite.”. 
125 See (quoting Erich Fromm) Rahel Jaeggi, Entfremdung: Zur Aktualität eines 
sozialphilosophischen Problems (Frankfurt aM: Campus, 2005) 42. 
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What they were up to was finding an alternative to human emancipation that 
is consistent with the modern form of political freedom.126  
Admittedly, nowhere else has the quest for the glory of the political been as 
bizarre and inhumane as in the context of European fascism. Nowhere else 
has, at the same time, the attempt to rescue human life from the grip of 
commodification given rise to such a number of diverse and relatively 
successful social models as in Western Europe. Nowhere have Christian 
parties, in particular, seen a greater hour than during Europe’s twentieth 
century.127  
In many respects, the modern welfare state represents an equivalent of the 
change from ancient liberty to representative democracy in the field of 
solidarity. Instead of involving the “Proletarian state” fully in extending 
concern and care for others, mechanisms are introduced to restore human 
dignity vis-à-vis humans who have lost their connection with one another in 
the seamless webs of collective private self-determination. Thus understood, 
the social welfare state “constitutionalizes” the Not- und Verstandesstaat. 
The point is not to establish central authority over markets but to make 
dependence on the market mechanism less oppressive. The social welfare 
state is the application of the principle of negative liberty, which constitutes 
the market economy, to the market economy itself. Like the negative liberty of 
economic liberalism it depends on something positive for its realization. 
Economic freedom rejects “state regulation” in order to enjoy the liberties 
defined by private law and protected by the administration justice. Similarly, 
                                                        
126 Its focus does not rest on creating the conditions for the emergence of a “total human being” 
whose abilities and ambitions would not be blemished by the discipline of the division of labour. 
See Iring Fetscher, Karl Marx und der Marxismus: Von der Ökonomiekritik zur Weltanschauung 
(4th ed. Munich: Piper, 1985) at 57, 229. 
127 On the consensus that capitalism had to be contained by the state, a consensus that emerged 
in the era after the Second World War, see Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2010) at 46-49.  
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social rights reject collective private self-determination and give people access 
to enjoy security on the basis of solidarity, that is, within systems designed to 
let the bad risks benefit from the participation of the good risks. In contrast to 
human emancipation, which would have ideally involved the “positive” 
freedom of participation in the exercise of joint control, the welfare state 
creates independence—freedom from interference with life by freedom of 
contract—by targeting the most salient risks and alienating consequences that 
arise when humans sever the ties that connect them with one another. The 
sick are not dependent on freedom of contract in order to have health 
insurance; the less well-off are not dependent on amassing wealth in order to 
be able to afford retirement; the unfit are not dependent on selling their own 
labor for their survival.  
With this emphasis on negative liberty from markets, the social welfare state 
stops short of realising a thick human community where individuals might be 
fully reconciled with their “species being”. The idea is that attempts at 
creating such a community would merely modify, but not mitigate, alienation 
and submission. Instead of aiming at full liberation it offers disentrapment or, 
put differently, decommodification.128 Instead of getting everyone, potentially, 
involved in the life of others, it promises individual liberation by alleviating 
the socially incarcerating effects of adaptation and dexterousness. Human 
dignity is restored vis-à-vis collective private self-determination. 
Unemployment benefits, pension payments and health care signal that 
individual life is not a commodity that society can dispose of as soon as 
demand has abated.129  
                                                        
128 See, generally, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990) 21-22. 
129 The welfare state, nonetheless, is consistent with individualism and with shifting the focus of 
life towards the private sphere. This shift is always likely to undermine its authority since it gives 
rise to a plain and potentially derogatory service mentality on the part of its clients. 
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Even though the welfare state is evidently compatible with liberal democracy, 
the social position that becomes universalized as the standard position of a 
member of society is no longer the property-owing citizen but the free 
laborer. The paradigmatic experience is not self-reliance, but self-alienation. 
The elementary social act is not freedom of choice but the reification of human 
nature into a resource. The most elementary threat does not originate from 
others pursuing their self-interest but rather from a structure of interaction in 
which one participates and from which one expects to benefit. Society is not 
perceived as the combined and somewhat haphazard result of an association 
of free individuals but as the unwieldy product of man-made, and therefore 
false, necessity. It is the self-made necessity revealed in a market-society’s 
relentless appetite for agility and adaptability. 
The partial decommodification of life—its disentrapment vis-à-vis collective 
private self-determination—can only be a common achievement. By virtue of 
being more than a mere fortunate effect of uncoordinated behavior it 
presupposes boundaries. The universality of the problem posed by the system 
of needs requires particularistic solutions simply because they cannot emerge 
from horizontal dealings. If the number of beneficiaries could without 
anything further grow at any time, the reciprocity of commitments would 
easily be undermined. If the individuals whose contributions go into 
redistribution—the wealthy, the healthy, and the young—could easily opt out 
and make arrangements among themselves or immunize their wealth and 
capital from the grip of taxation, the antithesis to market liberalism could not 
be sustained. It is an error to suppose that the particularity with which 
welfare states draw on “common sympathies” for their effectiveness is a 
deficient manner of addressing a universal problem. Rather, the particularity 
of bounded systems is justified inasmuch as it provides the key to dealing 
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effectively with a universal problem. It inherits, dialectically, its universality 
from what it addresses.  
Seeing the welfare state as the alternative to human emancipation that fits our 
modern understanding of liberty allows one to understand its significance. It 
has forever altered the meaning of the social question from relieving the lot of 
the poor to realizing a more modest project of emancipation. This is a 
historical sea change, which has had as its historical background the 
successful attempt to garner broader support from the middle class for social 
policy.130 It has given rise to a cluster of forms of life in Western European 
countries whose historical significance cannot be easily erased. In the 
collective memory of European history it has been inscribed as a singular 
achievement, and often, if only loosely, summarized under the name of 
“social justice”.  
 
The European Union 
In order for the Union to be seen as coextensive with this quest for a “third 
way”131 it would have to represent more than an administration of justice and 
a regulatory state. One would have to be able to link it to the pursuit of social 
justice.132 Alas, this is a jacket that does not fit the Union well. The Union lacks 
most of the competence in the social sphere.133 Even where formal powers are 
                                                        
130 See Judt, note 127 at 52-53. 
131 See my short comment, ‚Und was fehlt eigentlich? Eine Anmerkung zu Europas politischem 
Erfahrungsraum‘ In Ch. Joerges et al (eds.), „Schmerzliche Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit“ und 
der Prozess der Konstitutionalisierung Europas: Rechts-, Geschichts- und Politikwissenschaftliche 
Beiträge (Wiesbaden: SWV, 2008) 144-149 
132 See  
133 See Catherine Barnard, ‘Social Policy Revisited in the Light of the Constitutional Debate’ in C 
Barnard (ed.), The Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited: Assessing the Impact of the Constitutional 
Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 109-151. 
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available they cannot be exercised owing to a problem-solving gap.134 Where 
the Union has been successful, such as in the field of anti-discrimination 
policy, is has shifted the focus from distribution to inclusion and thereby 
become more compatible with the mindset of neoliberalism.135 Even worse, 
the recent developments of Commission proposals and the case law of the 
European Court of Justice betray a strong preference for a liberal social 
model.136 It makes it difficult to sustain other forms of organizing capitalism 
that are part of the national traditions of the member states. Finally, monetary 
union appears to have resulted in the rise of a collective Bonapartism that 
benefits bankers and harms low earners in the Union.137 
All in all, it is fair to say that the Union is not treading along with most of the 
Member States on this alternative and more circumspect path towards 
emancipation. For those who are already critical of the Union’s system of 
political economy this outcome will not come as a surprise. As an instance of 
an international federal system, the Union appears to be consistent with an 
essential element of the neoliberal program.138 Neoliberalism is not a 
champion of social justice, in particular not of social equality.139  
But perhaps the emancipatory promise of the European Union needs to be 
sought elsewhere. For if there were nothing to find it would remain 
inexplicable why sober minds believe, as Beck and Grande ostensibly do,140 
                                                        
134 See Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European 
Integration’ (1988) 88 Public Administration 239-278; idem, Democratic Legitimacy under 
Conditions of Regulatory Competition: Why Europe Differs from the United States’ in K Nicolaidis 
& R Howse (eds.), The Federal Vision (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001) 355-374. 
135 Or this is what I have argued. See my Engineering Equality: An Essay on European Anti-
Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
136 See Martin Höpner & Armin Schäfer, iidem, ‘Eine neue Phase der europäischen Integration: 
Legitimitätsdefizite europäischer Liberalisierungspolitik’ in M Höpner & A Schäfer (eds.), Die 
politische Ökonomie der europäischen Integration (Frankfurt aM: Campus Verlag, 2008) 129-156. 
137 See merely Hauke Brunkhorst, ‚Kollektiver Bonapartismus‘, 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-04-17-brunkhorst-de.html. 
138 See Hayek, note 73 at 28. 
139 See ibid. at 22, 31. 
140 See Ulrich Beck & Edgar Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa (Frankfurt aM, Suhrkamp, 2004). 
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that the Union is the last remaining utopia (unless they are easily swayed by 
deflated utopian energies).  
Indeed, the Union appears to have done something new. The Union has put 
the individual at the center. Lawyers have long been aware of this.141 Hence, 
when the project of social justice turns out to be ill suited to explain the 
Union’s potentially emancipatory appeal, perhaps one should examine how 
the Union articulates its concern for individuals vis-á-vis traditional 
collectivities. Emancipation from traditional social powers – would this not be 
an empowering program?  
A complacent reference to the protection of rights, however, alone will not do 
to mark the Union’s achievement.142 One would like to know what it is that is 
valued about people inasmuch as they are individuals in order to see how the 
Union might contribute to setting this valued element free. While several 
candidates for promoting individuals can be dismissed as irrelevant for the 
Union, such as Nietzsche’s perfectionism, others recommend themselves for 
historical reasons. I shall examine them in turn.  
I surmise that if there were a story to tell about European humanity beyond 
the twentieth century it would most likely see Europeans historically moving 
on from human emancipation via social justice towards empowerment. The 
question is, of course, whether it will have a happy end. 
 
 
                                                        
141 See, for example, F. G. Jacobs (ed.), European law and the Individual (Amsterdam: North-
Holland Pub. Co,, 1976) 
142 This explains, why the contributions by Williams and Neyer do not really get off the ground. 
See Andrew Williams, The Ethos of European Integration: Values, Law and Justice in the EU 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Jürgen Neyer, ‘Justice, Not Democracy: 
Legitimacy in the European Union’ (2010) 48 Journal of Common Market Studies 903-921. 
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Empowerment light 
What could it be over and above the sheer fact that people have rights that 
might prove that the European Union is committed to the individual?  
There are many ways for societies to put the individual at the center. What 
this means depends on why one believes individuals to be special in contrast 
to the “mass” of people or some collective body. One reason may be their 
vitality and their ability to enjoy life in spite of its futility. Arguably, one 
candidate for what it takes to put the individual at the center would be some 
form of Nietzschean elitism, which would have the weak-natured serve the 
strong-natured and the mass of society dedicated to the breeding (Züchtung) 
of great creatures (we cannot be sure that this was Nietzsche’s idea). 
Presumably, however, this is not the type of individualism that the European 
Union would publicly countenance, let alone endorse on its website.  
There is, however, an individualism that is more likely to fit the Union, 
namely that potentially wearisome, but democratically tamed Nietzschanism 
which perceives people capable of inventing and reinventing themselves as if 
their life and biography were pieces of art.143 One merely needs to downplay 
the playfulness inherent in this idea and shift the emphasis on individual 
choice, and all of a sudden it begins to resemble closely what the late Thomas 
Franck considered to be the mark of law in the age of individualism.  
According to Franck, the contemporary international system has given rise to 
an “emerging right to individuality”,144 which is concomitant to the demise of 
the nation as the definer of who people are. The new individualism perceives 
persons as choosing their own, “unique” identity without regard to “law, 
                                                        
143 See Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1985) 
144 Thomas M. Franck, The Empowered Self: Law and Society in the Age of Individualism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999) at 1. 
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custom, culture and religion”. They “design” their “freely chosen identities”, 
thereby drawing on a range of available options that has broadened 
exponentially.145 Franck seems to believe that the right to individuality, which 
is more or less the result of the confluence of a number of human rights,146 is 
most accurately epitomized by the right to privacy.147 Most fundamentally, 
asserting one’s individuality presupposes the right to be left alone by 
traditional communitarian powers, such as states, nations or religious 
congregations. It is from this perspective that Franck’s remark becomes 
intelligible that the “new individualists of the late twentieth century” no 
longer draw a line with regard to “the” other, but “identify with the alien 
other”.148 If one identifies with the alien other one regards oneself as someone 
who does not belong and stands aloof from territorially or biogenetically 
defined ties.149  
If this were the full story, Nietzsche would have been proven right who 
sensed already in the nineteenth century that Europe was to become more 
“artistic”.150 If people had the power to pick and choose their identity ad 
libitum such identity would have its ground only in a choice to adopt it. Once 
freely chosen, it could be equally freely relinquished. This infuses identity 
with irony, for there is nothing serious about an identity that is not 
appropriated in a process of discovery and recognition.151 People would 
invariably always merely play at being someone. The identity that is worn as 
a mask would barely conceal the arbitrariness of choice.  
                                                        
145 See ibid at 255. 
146 See ibid. at 280. 
147 See ibid. at 255, 283. 
148 See ibid. at 1. 
149 See ibid. at 2. 
150 Siehe Friedrich Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Kritische Studienausgabe (ed. G. Colli & 
M. Montinari, Munich: dtv, 1988), vol. 3, at 595-597. 
151 Remarkably, Richard Rorty was quite aware of this. See his Contingency, irony, and solidarity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) at 41-43. 
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But, of course, this is not the point that Franck wants to make. He states 
unmistakably that the “former enemies of individualism”—state, church, 
social class etc.—are now under an obligation “to play an active role in 
empowering everyone to realize their full potential in the pursuit of personal 
self-definition”152. This suggests that adopting an identity is neither a matter 
of whim nor an act of radical, Sartrean choice, but rather a process that 
requires discovering one’s “potential”.  
Thus understood, resting the focus on the individual would mean that the 
Union has an active role to play in helping individuals to succeed at becoming 
who they have the potential to be. This idea is, indeed, also known under the 
name of “empowerment”. It is, however, empowerment in a mild and less 
radical form since it does not yet embrace the categorical imperative of self-
activation, to which we shall return below.  
The idea that there is something in everyone waiting to be elicited and 
developed is a highly abstract and perhaps even relatively empty idea. It is 
abstract because it does not—at least not on its face—take into account that 
we discover what we can be by virtue of being invested in practices and 
sharing ambitions with others.153 There is nothing in us unless we discover it 
from within the social world that we inhabit.  The idea is also perilously close 
to being empty because it does not address the problem that certain potentials 
are more easily realized than others. 
 
 
 
                                                        
152 See Franck, note 144 at 256. 
153 See Jaeggi, note 125 at 197-198. 
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Personalism  
Franck’s statement of empowered individualism is reminiscent of a 
religiously inspired commitment to the human person that appears to have 
had some influence on the invention of modern human rights.154 It was also an 
element of the beliefs professed by some of the people who were instrumental 
in the founding of the European Community.155 It had been most prominently 
expressed in the writings of the French Catholic philosopher Jacques 
Maritain, but it is not at all limited to his work.  
The set of beliefs is called “personalism”.156 Generally, personalism is rather 
vague with regard to its practical implication. At any rate, it is socially much 
less radical than earlier versions of twentieth century Christian social 
doctrine.157 At its heart, it attempts a “balancing act”158 between the extremes 
of collectivism and unbridled individualism. It emphasizes the ontological 
distinctiveness of persons and their dignity.159 Persons are “somebody” and 
not “something”. Dignity invests them with inestimable worth. They are 
capable of self-determination.  
As part of God’s creation, persons ought to use their freedom responsibly, not 
least in order to realize their own ends within the larger scheme of things. 
Personalists claim that owing to the dignity of persons nobody may be fully 
absorbed into a collective body and be turned into a mere instrument of the 
                                                        
154 See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2010) at 54, 65, 74, 76-77. 
155 Major national politicians involved in the founding of the European Union were Christian 
Democrats (Alcide de Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman). See Jan-Werner Müller, 
Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth Century Europe (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2011) at 141. 
156 For a highly useful overview, see Thomas D. Williams & Jan Olaf Bengtsson, ‘Personalism’ In 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personalism. The former 
Pope Jean Paul IV is the author of various contributions to this type of philosophy.  
157 See Müller, note 155 at 134. 140-141. 
158 Ibid. at 140. 
159 See Williams & Bengtsson, note 156. 
Alexander Somek 
55   
 
community. Persons have to have rights. At the same time, personalists 
understand that human self-realization depends on the community, which is 
under an obligation to assist persons in realizing their ends. Persons can only 
flourish in communion with others. Society is not the haphazard 
agglomeration of antagonistic social atoms, but rather governed by the 
principles of solidarity and subsidiarity.  
Personalism, therefore, offers a reply to Frank’s concern that the right to be 
left alone needs to be complemented by a right “not to be left behind”.160 The 
most salient problem of this doctrine is, however, its lack of specificity. It is 
unclear under which contextual conditions individuals would be allowed or 
even expected to realize their potential and what this potential actually is. 
Humans have, as Huizinga has long emphasized, a potential for play. Is this 
the reason why Europe has become more artistic? 
The historically relevant portion of personalism is Christian in its orientation. 
One way of specifying a teaching that is in peril of easily becoming 
everybody’s darling would be to develop the historical seeds of personalism 
in the Union further into the direction of the “project world-ethos”.161 This 
would, for a change, connect Europe with the core of Christian teaching 
instead of associating, narrowly, the core of Christianity with how 
Catholicism deals with other faiths.162 It is to be feared, however, that the 
European Union is at least not yet prepared to take this step. 
 
                                                        
160 See Frank, note 144 at 256. Frank is strictly opposed to Küng’s attempt to complement 
fundamental rights with fundamental duties. In his opinion, this “recalls the plaints of traditional 
authoritarians against personal freedoms” (257). 
161 See http://www.weltethos.org/data-en/c-10-stiftung/10a-definition.php. 
162 The latter has been the focus of a rather bizzare pamphlet on “Christian Europe”. See J.H.H. 
Weiler, Ein Christliches Europa: Erkundungsgänge (trans. F. Reimer, Salzburg & Munich: Anton 
Pustet, 2004). 
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The Burkean individualist 
Sadly enough, it seems as though the search for what it means to take 
individuals seriously needs to return to the darker intellectual precincts of 
economic liberalism. What one discovers there, however, is astoundingly 
conformist. This, at any rate, is true of the individualism that was espoused 
by Friedrich August von Hayek as its true type.  
In many respects, Hayek has the strangest view of individualism not least 
because he assimilates it to his vision of how a competitive order works.163 
According to Hayek, “true” individualism humbly submits that no one is 
capable of knowing what is best for society as a whole for the simple reason 
that such a whole is incomprehensible.164 Since nobody can have this 
knowledge, it is better that people attend to their own business by drawing on 
what they know about their circumstances.165 This is how information is 
processed in a competitive order. What remote others seem to know about 
their own situation is represented in prices. If people take care of themselves 
they will inadvertently contribute to ends that are not part of their purpose166 
and bring about, as a side-effect of their action, the spontaneous order of 
society.167 Individualism does not advocate selfishness. It merely recognizes 
the bounded nature of rationality.168 Moreover, it teaches respect for the 
benefits that an unplanned and spontaneous order creates for all:169 
[...] [T]he fundamental attitude of true individualism is one of 
humility toward the process by which mankind has achieved 
                                                        
163 See, Hayek, note 73 at 6,14. 
164 See ibid. at 8. 
165 See Hayek, note 43 at 44. 
166 See Hayek, note 73 at 14-15. 
167 See ibid. at 7. 
168 See ibid. at 15. 
169 Ibid. at 31. See also his statement of the fundamental principle of liberalism in Hayek, note 43 
at 13: “[…] [I]n the ordering of our affairs we should make as much use as possible of the 
spontaneous forces of society, and resort as little as possible to coercion.” 
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things which have not been designed and understood by any 
individual and are indeed greater than individual minds. 
Such a “Burkean” individualism170 is “antirationalistic”.171 It concedes that 
individuals in coordinating their conduct need to rely on rules and 
institutions that cannot be created by individuals themselves because the type 
of reasonableness that they represent is untranslatable into the rationality of 
human action.  
Respect for tradition is, hence, the most salient trait of individuals who are 
individualists in the Hayekian sense. What is more, as Hayek himself 
observes, a truly (i.e., Anglo-American) individualistic society is so conformist 
in its demeanor that people with a Germanic individualistic background 
usually find it very disturbing.172 This conformism, however, is said to have a 
libertarian core, since it grows from the awareness that if conventions did not 
govern conduct coercion would have to step in. It also reflects a humble 
recognition of the wisdom of inexplicable traditions. Conformity and a habit 
of compliance guarantee the “smooth working of an individualist system”.173 
Economic individualism and the conformism that makes people predictable 
seem to go together well.  
 
Functional and organic individualism 
Not by accident, in presenting and defending the conventionalism of an 
individualistic society as a palatable alternative to coercion, Hayek reasons 
from a perspective that is interested in allocating the task of conducting 
oneself and of controlling or stimulating the conduct of others. Conduct that 
                                                        
170 See ibid. at 5. 
171 See ibid. at 11. 
172 See ibid. at 25-26. 
173 Ibid. at 26. 
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is aimed at controlling one’s own conduct and that of others is the subject of 
management and governance (or “governmentality”,174 using Foucault’s 
parlance).175 The attendant art of government is essentially concerned with 
“answering the question of how to introduce economy—that is to say, the 
correct way of managing individuals, goods, and wealth within the family 
[…]—[…] into the management of the state.”176 One core question, in this 
context, becomes how much governing is to be exercised either by public 
authorities or by individuals.177 The not so trivial presupposition is, of course, 
that “self-interest” will motivate individuals to govern the more unruly parts 
of their soul and to behave rationally.178 Once they do, they become calculable.  
As Foucault has reminded us, it is, in fact, the recurrent strategy of political 
economy to confront governments with the question whether they are 
governing too little or too much.179 The question is asked with an eye to an 
objective. As a practice of governing that gives rise to specific forms of self-
                                                        
174 See Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ In his Power (ed. J.D. Faubion, trans. R. Hurley et al, 
New York: New Press, 2000) 201-222, at 219-221.  
175 See Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ In Power, note 174, 326-349 at 341. “Government”, in 
the sense relevant to Foucault’s project covers “[…] not only the legitimately constituted forms of 
political or economic subjection but also modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, 
that were destined to act upon the possibilities of action for other people.”  
176 Foucault, note 174 at 207.  
177 It should not come as a surprise, hence, that Hayek admits, openly, that a liberal society is, in a 
sense, also “planned”, however, planned in a manner that gives ample room to the unplanned 
working of the competitive order. See Hayek note 43 at 26-27, 36. 
178 The most fundamental challenge is, as we have known since Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, 
to create a being that conceives of itself as the bearer of a long-term self-interest. See his Zur 
Genealogie der Moral. Eine Streitschrift (1887), Studienausgabe, note 150, vol. 5 at 292-293. The 
question has also drawn the attention of analytic moral philosophy and of “governmentality” 
studies. See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Theorists 
taking their cue from Foucault call that which constitutes the subject as a self-governing and 
responsible agent “bio-power”. See Barbara Cruikshank, The Will to Empower: Democratic 
Citizens and Other Subjects (Ithaka & London: Cornell University Press, 1999) at 41: “[…] 
[B]iopower operates to invest the citizen with a set of goals and self-understandings, and gives 
the citizen-subject and investment in participating voluntarily in programs, projects, and 
institutions set up to ‘help’ them.” 
179 See Foucault, note 72 at 17. 
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reflection, political economy and its techniques of government are supposed 
to serve the overall welfare of the population.180  
If Foucault is not mistaken, political economy generates limitations on raison 
d’État that are intrinsic to it.181 They are not extrinsic in the manner in which 
the norms of public law are, which established limits that can be highly 
inconsistent with the pursuit of governmental objectives. Rather, the raison 
d’État of political economy rests on achieving the best overall aggregative 
effects for the population, a matter which is supposed to be good for the 
state.182 One encounters reasoning underpinning the modern raison d’État 
where the issue is how much or how little state activity is necessary for the 
benefit of the population. From this perspective, one can examine the role of 
the individual and ask the question of how much individual initiative is 
desirable in light of the overall social net result; what in light of this overall 
result the task of public authorities might be and how much initiative is to be 
left to individuals.  
Certainly, I should offer apologies for introducing at a very late stage of this 
paper a distinction that may seem like a desperate attempt on the part of the 
author to make his text aesthetically congenial to analytic philosophy. 
Nevertheless, I believe it may be very helpful to perceive Hayek’s 
individualism as a functional—in contrast to an organic— manner of putting 
the individual at the center. Individual freedom and empowerment are 
evaluated from a functional perspective if their realization is viewed as 
desirable with regard to what they contribute to some overall state of affairs. 
It should not come as a surprise that liberal political economy is the mainstay 
of this form of individualism. In fact, as a way of thinking it is congenial to 
                                                        
180 See Foucault, note 174 at 211, 219; note 72 at 21. According to Foucault, the governing state is 
the successor to the state of the disciplinary society.  
181 See Foucault, note 72 at 13, 15.  
182 See ibid. at 15. The old raison d’État of the police state was merely concerned about 
strengthening the state apparatus.  
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how pre-modern political thought conceived of liberty in terms of plural 
“liberties”. People enjoy their liberties inasmuch as these are necessary to 
fulfill certain social functions.183 Liberty as such, by contrast, is not an end, let 
alone an end in itself. The overall aim is the welfare of society.184  
By contrast, organic individualism185 pays heed to how the individual is 
conducive to the weal of the whole and vice versa the whole conducive to the 
good of the individual. Most importantly, the individual good is not minted in 
the currency used for calculating the good of the whole. In other words, it 
cannot be expressed—at any rate not exclusively—in monetary terms. 
Organic individualism, in its most articulate form, limits the domain of 
money for the sake of the pursuit of other goods.186 
Liberal political economy, in order to be appealing to individuals, must try to 
pass as organic individualism despite its thoroughly functional orientation. 
An indication that it fails at this is that it cannot get any further than to 
conceive of freedom qua freedom of choice. That freedom also involves 
identification and commitment cannot be accounted for by it. It really does 
not know what to do with the idea that persons are a law unto themselves.  
This is not to say, however, that functional individualism could not become 
organic without losing its basic orientation. Changing the way of thinking 
cannot bring about such a transformation. It presupposes a change in the 
                                                        
183 See Dieter Grimm, Recht und Staat der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, 
1987) at 39-40. 
184 In the case of Hayek, this is evident whenever he described, almost with a hint of 
Schadenfreude, how individual planning and forsight can be thwarted by the incidence of 
innovation or suddendly shifting consumer demand. The ultimate value of the economic system 
is „what others deem to be useful“ and to reward individual effort and to respect choice. See 
Hayek, note 43 at 92-93.  
185 I should alert readers to the fact that the designation „organic individualism“ is used 
differently by Roderick T. Long, who uses it to classify strands of individualistic philosophy that 
see individuals as essentially related to one another. See his ‘The Classical Roots of Radical 
Individualism’ (2007) 24 Social Philosophy and Policy 262-297. 
186 See, as is well known, Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). 
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relation of self to self. Social reality is more adaptive than theory. Functional 
individualism becomes organic when being a fully functional individual it 
what individuals truly want to be. This happens as soon as the individual 
good becomes absorbed by the functional requirements of political economy, 
that is, when all that individuals expect from life is to be rewarded, even if 
without real merit,187 for the usefulness that their conduct might create for 
others. This means, most adequately understood, that functional 
individualism becomes organic if people conceive of their lives from an 
entrepreneurial point of view.188 Once the individual good is no longer 
outside the market and no longer expressed in anything else than the 
amassing of wealth, functional individualism ascends to organic height on the 
basis of the self-understanding of individuals. 
It becomes possible, then, to imagine a functional form of emancipation, that 
is, emancipation from being dysfunctional, or, put differently, emancipation 
in the state of liberalization and privatization.  
With that we can turn to empowerment.  
 
Full-bodied empowerment 
The most remarkable feature of “empowerment” is that, as a slogan, it has 
advanced since the 1960s to the level of a universal recipe against a variety of 
human ills.189 Not surprisingly, the term is used evocatively for the 
empowerment of groups (e.g., ethnic groups, women) as well as individuals190 
                                                        
187 On the constitutive role of luck, see Hayek, note 43 at 77. 
188 According to Cruikshank, note 178 at 39, Theresa Funicello describes this phenomenon as „the 
professionalisation of being human“. 
189 See Julian Rappaport, ‘The Power of Empowerment Language’ (1986) 16 Social Policy 15-21 at 
17-18; Cruikshank, note 178 at 68. 
190 See Bröckling, note 74 at 185, 189. 
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or in order to mobilize resistance as well as to encourage the development of 
entrepreneurship.191 Empowerment has become a darling token of both the 
left and the right. Moreover, empowerment can carry a communitarian 
connotation that promises to reconcile reinvigorated individualism with 
solidarity. In this usage, empowerment designates individuals and groups 
establishing closer connections with organizations.192  
In its application to both individuals and groups, empowerment is 
consistently about activation193 and encouraging people to govern 
themselves.194 More precisely, it is about activating some “potential” that is 
supposedly lying dormant owing to adverse social circumstance. Classical 
liberals seem to have believed that buried capabilities for activity would 
automatically rebound as soon as repression stops, in particular, the ability 
and the interest on the part of humans to take their life into their own 
hands.195 While the old subject of liberalism was believed to be driven by its 
desire for independence, the modern subject of empowerment is deemed to 
require stimulation or encouragement, in particular where staying passive 
promises to reap small benefits.196 The old subject of liberalism, once 
emancipated, enjoys its freedom. For the subjects of empowerment an act of 
emancipation is not enough. Even after emancipation they may remain 
vulnerable and weak. Their situation is characterized by widespread 
apathy.197 They need to be, first, identified as a group sharing a common 
interest, and, second, activated on the basis of some empowering 
                                                        
191 See Cruikshank note 178 at 67-68. 
192 See Stephanie Riger, ‘What’s wrong with Empowerment?’ (1993) 21 American Journal of 
Community Psychology 279-292 at 290; Cruikshank, note 178 at 89, 99. 
193 See Bröckling, note 74 at 192, 210. 
194 See Cruikshank, note 178 at 39. 
195 See on this feature of liberal individualism already John Dewey, ‘Individualism: Old and New’, 
The Later Works, 1925-1953 (ed. J. A. Boydston, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1984, vol. 5: 1929-1939, at 78-79. 
196 See, the telling story about the career of empowerment in the course of the Community Action 
Program, which was part of the strategy of the war on poverty, in Cruikshank, note 178 at 67-80. 
197 See ibid. at 73. 
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intervention, which will draw on sociological and psychological expertise.198 
The old subject of liberalism is capable of standing on its own feet if only it is 
allowed to do so. This is not the case for the subject of empowerment. It is 
habitually weak. 
Undoubtedly, the subject of empowerment is also a liberal subject, for it has 
rights. However, it no longer has the guts to exercise them. For example, it 
does not organize political resistance199 or voluntarily contribute fresh ideas to 
the success of the business. Hence, it needs to be trained and counseled in 
order to rise to its own feet.200  
The very fact that subjects of empowerment are in a situation of 
disempowerment already indicates that they have so far lacked the 
confidence, stamina, courage or social intelligence to pull themselves together 
and to discover their strength. Empowerment is the antidote to lethargy and 
acquiescence, but not a remedy for unequal legal status. In a social context, 
overcoming lethargy and resignation typically involves participation in 
processes of common problem solving.201 In the case of social policy, this 
means that people have to be assembled in constituencies and made to plan 
their own welfare.202  
As a word, “empowerment” has become a standard inventory of a variety of 
vocabularies, ranging from psychology, management, consulting to some 
languages of political dissent.203 Its widespread appeal—and the widespread 
longing for empowerment—seems to suggest that diagnosing vulnerability 
                                                        
198 According the Cruikshank, ibid. at 25, 72, 122, “the will to empower” is recognisable in the 
complaint that citizens (or employees) are apathetic and disinterested.  
199 This appears to have been the perception of “the poor” in the United States during the Johnson 
administration. See ibid. at 75-78 
200 See ibid. at 97. 
201 See Bröckling, note 74 at 188. 
202 See Cruikshank, note 178 at 74-77. As Cruikshank (75) points out, the empowering agents 
often have their own views of what the interests of the subject to be empowered are. The result is 
a clash of “the subjectivity of citizens with their subjection”.  
203 See Bröckling, note 74 at 182-186. 
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and weakness have come to play an increasingly prominent role in the 
interpretation of social experience.204 Seen from Marx’s perspective of human 
emancipation, this is indicative of a process of “individualisation”. If 
everyone is fending for him- or herself, everyone must feel weak.  
The cure to overcoming weakness is believed to lie in the experience of 
actively altering one’s situation. In this context, the discourse of 
empowerment suggests that the problems need to be whittled down to a scale 
at which the subjects of empowerment can solve them. Large ambitions create 
a discouraging sense of futility. Since empowerment basically acts upon the 
consciousness of the subjects to be empowered it is essential to help them 
discover strategies of self-help.205 Success at even small increments of 
empowerment exercises a positive re-enforcing effect on the self-esteem206 of 
the subjects to be empowered. More growth is possible on the basis of small 
beginnings.207  
 
One size fits all 
Evidently, empowerment is at odds with ambitious visions whose pursuit 
would require rebellion or revolution. Since these notoriously seem to be 
either unrealistic or dangerous a commitment to large-scale transformations 
often serves as a rationalization for not getting a hand on smaller problems. 
Moreover, the empowering subject does not—in marked contrast to a 
vanguard party—appear in the position to assert the objective interest of a 
class even vis-à-vis the individual members of this class. It is not the case, 
                                                        
204 See Bröckling, note 74 at 201. 
205 See Cruikshank, note 178 at 70-71. 
206 On the self-esteem movement of the 1980s, see Cruikshank, note 178 at 88-95. The idea 
appears to have been that lack of self-esteem is the cause of all social ills. Of course, there was no 
proof for this.  
207 See the references in Bröckling, note 74  at 188. 
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hence, that the subjects to be empowered perceive the knowledge that they 
should have of their situation and their interests represented in the 
knowledge of their empowering leaders.208  
The standard situation that appears to call for empowerment is competitive. 
Empowerment does not begin with a moral examination of the current state 
of affairs. Nor does it conclude with what has to be done in order for justice to 
prevail. It does not ask whose fault it might have been that things are the way 
they are; it is not of interest, in particular, to establish that the subject of 
empowerment may be responsible for its disempowerment.209 Rather, 
empowerment is essentially forward-looking in its drive to activate subjects to 
mobilize themselves.  
Empowerment is, therefore, the reverse of human emancipation. The 
competitive situation is left in place. The redistribution of power is not the 
issue.210 What matters, rather, are discrete and context-specific efforts at 
leveling power asymmetries. This begins with making people feel more 
powerful by giving them clues as to where the source of their strength might 
lie.211 The idea is that once people feel better about themselves they will 
realize what they are able to do. Not surprisingly, the technique of 
empowerment is kindred to psychological counseling rather than political 
leadership.212 Liberation is a matter of working on the psyche, guided by 
experts, and not of political strategy.213  
                                                        
208 For a critique of this Leninist conception of the party, as articulated by Lukács, see Jürgen 
Habermas, Theorie und Praxis: Sozialphilosophische Studien (2d. ed., Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, 
1971) at 40-41. 
209 See ibid. at 201-202. 
210 See ibid. at 193. 
211 See ibid. at 201, 203. 
212 This is evident in the writings of one of the first advocates of what would become 
“empowerment”, Paulo Freire, whose pedagogy of the oppressed was sharply opposed to social 
policy that merely wanted to assist people. See  
213 See Cruikshank, note 178 at 92. 
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Empowerment is remarkably universal. Above all, it cannot be reconciled 
with the idea that some may simply have to live less active lives than others 
by virtue of who they are. Apparently, this is what remains of the idea of 
justice, namely, an equal entitlement to activation. Disabled people have a 
claim to empowerment. This means they have to be given an opportunity, 
and the wherewithal, to participate in a life form that is essentially active. 
Their entitlement is functional. The right to be activated is functionally 
necessary in order to be recognized as an equally active participant, for if one 
were not one would be registered as abnormal pursuant to the ruling 
standards of social distinction. The entitlement to activation is a functional 
correlate of a duty towards oneself to earn social recognition subject to the 
conventional terms established in societies. Moreover, fulfilling the 
entitlement to be spurred into activity is also believed to be good for society. 
A democratic society depends on the participation of its citizens and on their 
ability to conduct themselves in communication with others.214 
The universal entitlement to be thrown into the mode of self-activation is also 
deemed to be a strategy for reconciling individuals with larger organizations. 
Lethargic employees are deemed to be “empowered” when managers have 
succeeded at motivating them to take a more active part in their business. 
Even in this context it is taken for granted that it is desirable to participate 
and that there is no deeper conflict of interest between individuals and 
organizations.215 The premise appears to be that playing a role in the success 
                                                        
214 See ibid. at 91. 
215 This prestabilised harmony is captured in the otherwise rather fuzzy Foucauldian term of 
“bio-power”. See Cruikshank, note 178 at 39-40: “[…] [B]io-power, through the administration 
and regulation of life and its needs enacts the good of all society upon the antisocial bodies of the 
poor, deviant and unhealthy. It seeks to unite the interests of the individual with the interest of 
society as a whole.”  
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of the latter is important for experiencing personal success.216 Identification 
with the business is what is supposed to bridge the gap.  
Given that empowerment has such a variety of applications, it appears to be a 
universal strategy for reconciling persons with their social context.217 It seems 
to be the one and only panacea that is applicable everywhere. Nevertheless, 
empowerment betrays a rather liberal outlook. The empowering agent does 
not have to have a vision of what the social situation of the subject to be 
empowered would have to be like in the future. The agent does not shoulder 
any responsibility. She is not part of the group to be empowered. All that the 
agent has to do is to stimulate the capacity for action. She does not have to be 
committed to any cause. She does not have to make an attempt to change the 
overall context of action. Since empowerment is played out in competitive 
situations the context will likely change as a result of acts by the empowered 
subject. The agent does not have to take sides. Empowerment is apolitical. It is 
a technique of activating the disheartened and overwhelmed.  
 
Empowerment in the European Union 
Even though “empowerment” appears to signify a variety of things, its 
various meanings revolve around a non-trivial core. The overall goal is to kick 
people who feel weak out of an habitual attitude of acquiescence. Activation 
goes beyond the level of rights and affects real capabilities. It is reinforced 
through the experience of problem-solving. Since empowerment involves in 
one way or another participation, it supposedly reconciles people with their 
                                                        
216 Another connection between the interest of society and the interest of the individual is that 
society benefits from empowered individuals who have learned to conduct themselves and that 
they can join forces in order to become even more powerful. See ibid. at 91, 97. 
217 See Bröckling, note 74 at 193. 
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social environment. In the course of participation they begin to identify with 
the goals of an organization or of a community. 
The composite of meanings of empowerment can be encountered also in the 
context of the European Union. There is, to begin with, talk of empowerment 
in the sense of stakeholder participation in the context of policy formation. 
This was the clear message of the proposed new strategy of generating ideas 
for “social innovation” through the interaction with affected groups.218 
Stakeholder involvement is also deemed important when it comes to 
developing strategies for a secure information society. In this context, 
empowerment appears as a synonym for the participation of public (e.g., the 
Member States) and private actors.219  
Likewise, “women’s empowerment” is a topic that emerges in the context of 
development policy.220 The requisite EU Action Plan states that “not only civil 
and political rights but also the implementation of economic, social, cultural 
and labor rights […] are vital for achieving women’s empowerment.”221 The 
emphasis on implementation suggests, again, that empowerment concerns the 
social effect of the enjoyment of rights and not merely their formal 
recognition. Empowered women draw their strengths from the awareness 
that their rights are fully respected. Similarly, the EU speaks of the economic 
empowerment of women and means that they become economically active as 
either self-employed or employees.222  
                                                        
218 See above note 4.  
219 See Commission Communication, ‘A strategy for a Secure Information Society – “Dialogue, 
partnership and empowerment”’, SEC(2006) 656. 
220 See Commission Communication, ‘Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015’, 
SEC(2010) 1079 at 9. 
221 European Commission, ‘EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in 
Development 2010-2015’, http://www.dev-
practitioners.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/EU_GEAP.pdf at 7. 
222 See ibid., at 9. 
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That empowerment looks beyond the mere legal status and designates the 
actual capabilities of people emerges clearly from how the Commission 
proposes to “empower consumers”. It concerns the “ability of consumers” to 
understand their choices. Consumers should, according to the Commission, 
be in such a position even where there is no concern that businesses have 
concealed information or engaged in any other form of misleading 
behavior.223 Consumer empowerment is identified with “the levels of 
consumer education, information, understanding, consumer literacy/skills, 
awareness and assertiveness”.224 Remarkably, smart consumer behavior is 
linked to the improvement of markets since misinformed consumer choice 
gives rise to an inefficient allocation of resources:225 
Efficient and responsive consumer markets across the economy 
are key drivers of competitiveness and citizen’s welfare. They 
need empowered consumers able to make informed choices 
and quickly reward efficient operators. Markets where 
consumers are confused, misled, have no access, or have little 
choice will be less competitive and generate more consumer 
detriment, at the cost to the efficiency of the overall economy. 
Putting it bluntly, widespread consumer stupidity creates an externality for 
the few smart consumers who have to but put up with incompetent 
businesses dominating the market.  
Finally, “empowerment” appears at a key place of the so-called Renewed 
Social Agenda. It states that the means to achieve the fundamental goals of 
Union policy have to be adjusted towards “empowering and enabling 
individuals to realize their potential while at the same time helping those who 
are unable to do so.”226 Despite its high level of generality, the message is 
relatively clear. Social objectives are to be attained by activating individuals—
                                                        
223 See Commission Communication, ‘Monitoring consumer outcomes in the single market: the 
Consumer Markets Scoreboard’ at 5 (para. 19)m 8 (para. 35) 
224 See ibid at 7 (para. 32). 
225 See ibid at. 3 (para.  6). 
226 Commission Communication, ‘Renewed social agenda: Opportunities, access and solidarity in 
the 21st century’, SEC(2008) 2184 at 3. 
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or rather, by encouraging them to self-activate. Those who cannot be 
galvanized count as quasi-disabled and are, owing to their disability, eligible 
for additional support. The Agenda stresses, among other things, the 
necessity to provide access for all individuals to the means of achievement. 
But achievements do not exist for the individual alone. The Agenda is quite 
clear that the triadic strategy of “opportunity, access and solidarity” is 
supposed to serve the Union’s economic objectives. It says that education and 
“investing in human capital” are important to facilitate labor market 
participation and social inclusion. They are also deemed to be critical to 
enhancing the competitiveness of the European economy as a whole.227  
This is a manifestation of the functional individualism mentioned above. 
Nothing, indeed, could be further removed from the ideal of human 
emancipation than the sketch of the ideal individual employee that the 
Commission seeks to breed through the channels of the open co-ordination 
process. In a “rapidly changing world”, Commission says, people need to 
avail themselves of opportunities at different stages of their lives. This means 
that they have to be committed to “lifelong learning and ongoing renewal of 
skills attuned to present and future labor market needs”.228 And, of course, as 
a captatio benevolentiae “entrepreneurship” is mentioned in passing.  
Permanent activation in the pursuit of adaptation is what appears to be meant 
by empowerment in the Union.  
 
 
 
                                                        
227 See ibid. at 9. 
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Conclusion: From Rosa Luxemburg to Steven Jobs 
The European strategy of emancipation that has been successful in the 
twentieth century was committed to creating negative freedom from the 
market. Culturally, it must have been based on the convergence of the 
proletarian and pre-protestant/bourgeois desire to minimize the sway of work 
and profession over human life. It was a world where one did not have to be 
healthy but could afford to be sick; where jobs would be available even for 
people with low ambition; where people were looking forward to retirement 
and had no problem with leaving their desks for the next generation.   
Empowerment reverses this orientation. It “emancipates” from the passivity 
that may be the last refuge of those whose life lies outside the busyness of 
economic dealings. In other words, while the welfare state emancipated 
people from the adverse effects of the imperative of inclusive fitness, 
empowerment emancipates people from their lack of fitness. From the 
perspective of markets, it goes to the root of the problem. The previous 
attempt of emancipating people from the negative consequences of their 
unfitness involved the recognition that it is not a defect if one is ill, old, slow, 
dim-witted or relatively lazy. Activating the inactive, by contrast, revokes this 
recognition.  
Both human emancipation and the negative liberty from markets require a 
collective effort and are supposed to be a common achievement. Against this 
background, empowerment is quite a paradoxical ideal. It presents 
emancipation, first, in individualized form and, second, as immanent to the 
market. Empowerment retracts the liberating impulse into the market. It is the 
economic emancipation from the market, which is co-extensive with the idea 
that it is possible to rise above the market from within. Not by accident, the 
figure that is most admired in a market economy is the participant that 
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succeeds at defying market pressures. This is the entrepreneur. The 
entrepreneur overcomes the rational shackles of the market calculation. 
Entrepreneurs do not merely react to the demands made by others. They take 
the lead. True entrepreneurs influence factors that are beyond the control of 
ordinary market participants because they are able to divine the desires of 
consumers at a time when these consumers do not yet have the slightest idea 
that they are going to have them. In a sense, they have the powers equivalent 
to the vanguard party. 
Rosa Luxemburg believed that small-scale protest and industrial action would 
be the school for the working class to realize that their freedom depends on 
their solidarity.229 This is continuous with the idea of human emancipation. 
European humanity has taken leave of this idea. Today, rather, the hero of 
emancipation is the innovative entrepreneur who succeeds at establishing a 
monopoly. The entrepreneur is the monopolist who deserves to be in this 
position by virtue of ingenuity and charisma. Entrepreneurs are more than, 
and different from, rationally calculating managers.230 They are driven by 
unconventional ideas and tireless in moving forward. Entrepreneurs have an 
edge, supreme intuition, stamina, instinct and luck. The have courage, and 
owing to their courage they have the power to change markets by market 
means. Their success is manifest in how they stamp out others. They, if 
anyone, represent the promise of ancient liberty in individualized economic 
terms. They are, in other words, the embodiment of the empowered 
individual.  
Rather than the general strike, the entrepreneur is the “myth” of our time. It is 
a strange projection into the individual of what people could do if only they 
were still able to exercise the freedom of the ancients.   
                                                        
229 See above note 48. 
230 See Weber, WuG 129. 
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